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ABSTRACT

This report resulted from a national workshop held September 5-6, 1995, near Johannesburg, South Africa. The theme of the workshop, "Reflections on Conflict and Peace," was chosen to echo the nature and purpose of the workshop. The major papers presented include: (1) "Conflict and Peace Research Methodology" (Louise Nieuwmeijer); (2) "Research Capacity Building among Practitioners" (Jannie Malan); (3) "Forging a New Bureaucracy: Guidelines for Research on Conflict Resolution" (Fanie Cloete); (4) "African Methods of Resolving Disputes" (Jannie Malan); (5) "Mediation of Family Conflict" (Hugo van der Merwe); (6) "Resolving Conflict in Communities in South Africa" (Gavin Bradshaw); (7) "Violence and Conflict" (Jabulani Mabasu); (8) "A New Approach to National and Regional Security" (Laurie Nathan); (9) "Security and Peace" (Mark Shaw); (10) "The South African Police Service in Transition: Attitudes, Perceptions, and Values of Police Personnel in an Eastern Cape Community" (Rob Midgley; Geoff Wood); (11) "Conflict in Education" (Rejoice Ncgongo); (12) "Conflict and Empowerment of the Youth" (Johan Olivier); (13) "Development and Conflict" (Theledi Sebulela); (14) "Labour Conflict" (Renee du Toit); (15) "Conflict, Co-operation, and Change in South Africa" (Peter Cunningham); and (16) "Conclusion: The Realities and Challenges of Conflict and Peace Research" (Louise Nieuwmeijer; Anita Burger). (EH)

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CONFLICT AND PEACE RESEARCH: SOUTH AFRICAN REALITIES AND CHALLENGES

Editors:
Louise Nieuwmeijer
Johan Olivier

SO 029 179

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Compilation of workshop discussions: Anita Burger

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About the editors

Louise Nieuwmeijer is a consultant to the Group: Human Resources of the Human Sciences Research Council and Executive Director of SOAR, a Centre for Conflict and Communication Management. She received her Doctoral Degree in Communication Science at the University of the Free Sate in 1989. She undertakes, co-ordinates and manages research, training and consultation in conflict management and organisational communication for both public and private organisations, as well as on an international level. She acts as consultant for civic associations, trade unions, local authorities and private organisations with regard to squatting, community involvement in physical development, facilitation of negotiation forums and communication between management and workers in the community in order to break strikes. She is author and co-author of various books, scientific journal articles and reports in these areas. She works closely with scholars and practitioners in Europe and North America. Dr. Nieuwmeijer received the HSRC President's Medallion in 1988 for her contribution to the establishment of Negotiation Research in South Africa and in 1992 the Council's Award for Multi-disciplinary Research on Squatting. She is listed in Harvard's International Directory for Scholars and Practitioners in Negotiation and was selected and accepted by all the signatories of the National Peace Accord as one of four South Africans to be a member of an international committee that evaluated the effectiveness of the peace structures. She was responsible for the section on policing, security forces and communication. Dr. Nieuwmeijer is currently the coordinator of the National Programme on Research in Conflict and Peace and a national executive committee member of the National Association for Women Business Owners.

Johan Olivier is a Chief Research Specialist in the centre for Socio-political Analysis of the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC). He holds a Ph.D. degree in Sociology from Cornell University (USA). He was manager of the Co-operative Research Programme on South African Youth (1991-1994). His research interests are in the fields of social movements and political protest activities, ethnic/racial conflict and mobilisation and research methodology. He was local convenor of two international panels of experts appointed by the Goldstone Commission of Inquiry into the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation during 1992 and 1993. The first panel advised the Commission on procedures for mass demonstrations and the second panel on the procedure for the first democratic elections in South Africa. During the period March-July 1995 he was a member of the Technical Committee on Public Order Policing which was appointed by the Commissioner of the South Africa Police Service. He has been a member of the Board of Directors of the Human Rights Institute of South Africa since 1993. He is a recipient of the P.M. Robbertse Medal (1993) - the HSRC's highest internal research award - and the Council's Award for Multi-disciplinary Research (1995). He is a member of the South African Sociological Association, the American Sociological Association and the International Sociological Association.

PREFACE

Conflict and Peace Research: South African Realities and Challenges resulted from a national workshop held on 5 and 6 September 1995 near Johannesburg. The theme of the workshop, *Reflections on Conflict and Peace*, was chosen to echo the nature and purpose of the workshop, namely to reflect, interact and debate, rather than simply listen to a series of papers being delivered.

The participation of researchers from diverse disciplines and conflict arenas was a contribution to knowledge building in the field in its own right. The purpose of the workshop was to identify and discuss the most salient research issues in the field of conflict and peace. Many of the participants were involved in policy making and in practice, but the focus of the workshop was on research in the field, as this had been neglected most during the past decade. South Africa is one of the best live laboratories for conflict and peace studies, but researchers in this country are barely part of the international debate. This publication incorporates all contributions made at the workshop.

The second purpose of the workshop was capacity building. Many practitioners have the ability to gather excellent research data, but do not possess the knowledge and ability to interpret and document it. Researchers, on the other hand, often spend so much time in practice that they do not have time to do research. The hope was that researchers would be able to identify and develop methods to deal with this issue during Jannie Malan's session on capacity building.

The initial steering committee members of the Human Sciences Research Council's National Programme for Conflict Management, responsible for the idea of the national workshop were: Vasu Gounden (Director of ACCORD), Gavin Bradshaw (Institute of Conflict Resolution Research, UPE), Professor Laurie Nathan (Executive Director of the Centre for Conflict Resolution, UCT), Professor Ampie Muller (Consultant at the previously mentioned centre), Professor Fanie Cloete (School for Public Management, University of Stellenbosch) and Dr Louise Nieuwmeijer (a consultant to the HSRC).

Anita Burger and Rachelle Fourie are thanked for their contribution to the arrangements of the workshop, and Anita for the compilation of most of the discussion sessions for the book. Dr Sunette van der Walt, Executive Director of the Group for Human Resources of the HSRC went to a great deal of trouble to get the project approved by the HSRC's Research Committee. The project was funded by the HSRC.

The Editors
November 1995

CONTENTS

1	Conflict and peace research methodology *Louise Nieuwmeijer*	1
2	Research capacity building among practitioners *Jannie Malan*	7
3	Forging a new bureaucracy: guidelines for research on conflict resolution *Fanie Cloete*	11
4	African methods of resolving disputes *Jannie Malan*	17
5	Mediation of family conflict *Hugo van der Merwe*	21
6	Resolving conflict in communities in South Africa *Gavin Bradshaw*	29
7	Violence and conflict *Jabulani Mabasu*	43
8	A new approach to national and regional security *Laurie Nathan*	49
9	Security and peace *Mark Shaw*	59
10	The South African Police Service in transition: attitudes, perceptions and values of police personnel in an Eastern Cape community *Rob Midgley and Geoff Wood*	63
11	Conflict in education *Rejoice Ncgongo*	83
12	Conflict and empowerment of the youth *Johan Olivier*	87
13	Development and conflict *Theledi Sebulela*	93
14	Labour conflict *Renée du Toit*	97
15	Conflict, co-operation and change in South Africa *Peter Cunningham*	101
16	Conclusion: The realities and challenges of conflict and peace research *Louise Nieuwmeijer and Anita Burger*	105

1

CONFLICT AND PEACE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

LOUISE NIEUWMEIJER *

The past two decades have witnessed the development and proliferation of a variety of research methodological approaches in the field of conflict and peace. Together they amount to a whole new range of methodologies covering both theory and research (Sandole and Van der Merwe, 1993).

It is difficult to determine the boundaries of this field as there are so many subcategories and each researcher delineates the field in a different way. Researchers work at different levels, and in different arenas and disciplines. The levels can range from interpersonal to international. The conflict arenas vary from family, community and labour to political and contracts. Law, public management, industrial psychology, anthropology, social work, international diplomacy and psychology are some of the disciplines involved in the field of conflict and peace. Considerable differences in theoretical assumptions and the decisions on and applications of research methods are therefore present in the field.

Finding an analytical framework that enables one to organize the research methodology that emerges from such different theoretical paradigms and assumptions for discussion purposes is a major challenge.

Analytical framework

To enable one to order the variety of research methodologies used in peace and conflict in South Africa for discussion purposes, it is necessary to find or develop a useful analytical framework. Finding such a framework is not simplified by the researcher being able to utilize a single scientific journal. Articles in the field are published through a variety of journals. Some analytical framework, however, needs to be identified to study the different methodologies used to undertake studies in conflict and peace.

The best answer is usually to go back to the basics, or a simple framework that will allow the inclusion of all research methods while helping to organize methods in the field. A basic framework that proves useful is the Dimensions of Research used by Van Leent (1965) and applied by Marais (1979). According to Van Leent scientific space exists in three dimensions, namely breadth, height and depth.

* Dr. Louise Nieuwmeijer, Consultant: Human Sciences Research Council and Executive Director: SOAR, A Centre for Conflict and Communication Management.

The height dimension is known for systematically built theories, built on empirical data through increasingly abstract levels. A single variable is taken by the researcher and studied in depth. The purpose is to *explain* the variable through the use of a research design. Research in this dimension entails laboratory research and is quantitative in nature. These methods are mainly used by Western European and some North American researchers in the field of conflict and peace. Examples are the work of Van der Vliert at Groningen University, Jansen and colleagues at Utrecht University and Bazerman at North Western University in Evanston, Chicago. Putnam, Jones and Wilson of Purdue University use different category systems to analyse simulated negotiations. No research undertaken in South Africa, has as yet been published where researchers utilize this category of methods.

Research methods that can be categorized as falling in the breadth dimension mostly include survey and fieldwork methods. The purpose is to *describe* the phenomena as they occur in their real surroundings. All aspects of the methodology are as inclusive as possible. Only a few South African researchers are involved in this type of research, for example Midgley, who does research on safety and policing in Grahamstown, De Kock at the Centre for the Analysis and Interpretation of Crime Information at the South African Police Service, and Olivier from the Human Sciences Research Council. Very little has been published on the use of this type of research method in the field of conflict and peace by overseas researchers. Data collected through this research is quantitative.

Depth dimension research methods aim at *understanding* conflict and peace as phenomena. Questionnaires and other measuring instruments, contextualizing, and comparisons are some of the methods used in this dimension. Researchers in the field of conflict and peace who utilise this type of research are, for example, Pruitt of Buffalo University (New York State), Zartman of John Hopkins University, Cloete of the University of Stellenbosch, Nathan of the Centre for Conflict Resolution in Cape Town, Cilliers of the Institute for Defence Policies (Midrand), Mills at the South African Institute for Internal Affairs and Bradshaw at the University of Port Elizabeth. The type of data collected is typical of research in and by the depth dimension. Methods employed are qualitative by nature.

Depth dimension research methods are most used in the field of conflict and peace both in South Africa and overseas, while height dimension methods are hardly used in South Africa at all.

Combination of research dimensions

A combination of different types of research dimensions is used in some South African studies. Methodologies that complement one another or a marriage of different methodological perspectives seems to be most suitable to describe, explain or understand the complexity of the South African situation. The researchers' work mostly involves a combination of qualitative and quantitative research methods, as the complexity of the different levels of research and practice is best served by a combination of the different dimensions of research. An example of such research is a research framework adapted to analyse conflict management workshops, combined with interviews to identify the underlying sources of conflict in South African communities (Nieuwmeijer, 1994).

Research questions

Research issues identified for debate on research methodology in the field of conflict and peace in South Africa, are the following:

- Should existing methodologies be used or should new ones be developed?
- Will increased interaction between researchers and practitioners enhance the development and use of relevant research methodologies?

The development or use of existing methods

In South Africa theoretical analysis, descriptive studies and raw data are not fully utilized. A question to be addressed in this field of conflict and peace is whether existing research methodology is sufficient or whether new methodology needs to be developed. Do we have to assess the existing methodology and consider whether researchers are mainly concentrating on the same methods? Do we have to decide to use different methods?

There are several viewpoints on the above questions. We should capitalize on different methodologies available to us in the social sciences. One viewpoint is that descriptions and discussions of research methods published in South African and international journals are invariably of static methodologies, for example, a survey giving snapshot of a moment. We need a dynamic method of measuring conflict over a period of time. There is a mismatch between the methods used and the dynamics of the process, and we need a clearer understanding of these dynamics. By way of example: Data on different events is collected daily and this data includes different variables and types of information. One of the most critical variables is the timing between different conflict events. Without time as a variable, dynamic analysis is not possible. By looking at time as a dependent variable the intervals between events can be explained, as well as the reasons for short and long intervals between the events. Independent variables can include demographic dynamics, economic indicators, police action at specific events, etcetera. By determining the influence of time as a dependent variable the researcher is able to make a dynamic analysis of the situation. It also gives interesting new insights into the dynamics of events and how they influence each other.

Another viewpoint is that conflict must be seen as a process and should not only focus on a single event. Events are singular and static and to contextualise the process of conflict, one needs a pre-phase and a post-phase with qualitative and quantitative analysis. How can one determine which events to record? What are the sources of this information? Although it is difficult to determine the events and sources, the data collected nevertheless provides valuable recorded information. A more flexible approach towards the methodology in the field is needed. What can be done with the data? Researchers should not restrict themselves to different methods but rather transcend these to explore other possibilities. We need more creative methodologies and dynamic methodologists.

We should ask ourselves whether we are satisfied with what we have in terms of research. The research problem will often in itself determine the method to be followed. Some situations may require descriptive studies of exactly what happened. One's methodology therefore depends on what one wants to do and this determines the criteria. Different types of methodologies at different levels may also be necessary.

Scientific reliability of data

One must be cautious in asking the question whether data is scientifically reliable. We cannot provide data that is valid for all cases. We need to be flexible and build this flexibility into the actual research results. There will always be a value judgement involved in social research because of the multifaceted nature of the situation. Researchers should not only focus on positivistic types of research but also on trends, as well as longitudinal analysis. Intuition and creativity are important and must be allowed to enhance research.

If one restricts oneself to a single methodology one will not understand the phenomena as well as those researchers exploring other possibilities and combinations of research methodologies. Different methodologies provide better insight when such a variety of disciplines and approaches is involved. It is important to remember that the "animal" we are studying is dynamic.

Research data can also be provided by the perceptions and feelings of the subjects being studied. People's perceptions play an important role and directly influence the research. It is therefore important to understand how people feel when research is being done.

Capacity building in research methodology

Building capacity in research methodology is important. Those doing research directly influence the way in which it is done. It is important to focus on the purpose of our research. Is it aimed at solving conflict? Do we take into account the values of participants involved in the dispute? The research methodology used must accommodate the people we research and the way in which questions are posed must indirectly be formulated by our participants. Conflict can not be separated from behaviour and it is therefore important to know how people experience conflict and what they react to.

Researchers use certain tools to assist them in their research. In some situations the tools work but will the same tools work again in another situation during a different time period? We need more depth in our research because we are doing research on people who intervene and this poses a problem because they are often not the people who cause the conflict. The deeper psychology and circumstances need to be identified and analysed.

One of the mistakes that researchers make is to involve people and communities in research just for the sake of involving them. They should be involved because they have an important contribution to make. In many instances the lack of no real involvement is the reason why researchers are not welcome in some communities. Members of the communities should be encouraged to understand the need and potential influence of research on the conflict. An understanding of their role in the collection of data will enhance the results and build research capacity. The reason for this is that in the case of the conflict and peace field there are *skills access* to research on the other. It is only by getting communities involved in research that research capacity can be built and access gained to research.

Increased interaction between researchers and communities

Should we encourage interaction between researchers and community members so as to educate communities in research methodologies?

In South Africa researchers and communities are generally isolated from one another. Researchers extract information from communities but the communities receive no benefits in return. A reason for this may be that researchers are under pressure to produce workable results in order to receive funding for future research. Funders of the research expect researchers to be practical and to prove their worth. Researchers must, however, see this as a challenge and not as a threat.

It is important for researchers to give feedback to communities on their research results and the implementation thereof. The way in which feedback is established with the communities reduces much of the resistance from communities towards researchers. In some situations miscommunication occurs between researchers and communities concerning the building of expectations and then keeping to them. It is therefore necessary to educate communities that research is part of the process of trying to resolve the conflict and not the final way to resolve it. Researchers must take care not to "over research" certain communities.

Conclusion

The above discussion of the methodological issues debated by the South African and some overseas researchers in the field of conflict and peace suggests that there has been an interesting change in the focus of research methods. Researchers are starting to do more qualitative research than they did in the past when the focus was more on quantitative research. They have become more participative and not just observers of the research. Researchers must, however, be careful not to become too participative as this can adversely influence their objectivity and the subjects they are studying.

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2

RESEARCH CAPACITY BUILDING AMONG PRACTITIONERS

JANNIE MALAN *

In the field of conflict understanding and conflict resolution it is possible to distinguish between the work of practitioners, trainers and researchers. Although the responsibilities of these groups are inevitably interrelated, and although individuals may belong to more than one group at the same time, each group may nevertheless tend to lose sight of the work of the others. Practitioners in particular, who constantly have more work than they can manage, can be tempted to disregard the efforts and findings of researchers.

Practitioners can indeed argue that they have enough knowledge and expertise at their disposal, and that existing methods and techniques produce satisfactory results. Some of them may even suggest that researchers should leave their relatively "easy" work and help share the overwhelming burden of practical conflict resolution.

Researchers can produce convincing arguments, however, to justify their work. Numerous examples exist of fruitful co-operation between universities offering conflict studies courses and institutes or centres rendering conflict resolution services to the public (cf. Wien, 1984:630-667; Malan, 1987:8-9). Teaching and research staff can make their expertise and findings available to the training and mediating staff. These practitioners can in turn share their learning experiences with their academic colleagues.

The importance and value of this general interrelatedness, and of particular links, were strongly emphasized during the proceedings of the workshop. Similar points were made at all the preceding regional workshops (Nieuwmeijer et al, 1995). An appropriate and stimulating example is the research project undertaken in 1982 by Kenneth Hawkins, Training Director of the San Francisco Community Board Centre for Policy and Training. A few sentences are worth quoting:

> *Sensing that important 'secrets' could be gleaned from Community Board dispute resolution sessions, Kenneth spent hundreds of hours observing movement and relational contexts as disputants expressed conflicts.*
>
> *From these methodical observations and the discussion they generated among trainers, patterns gradually emerged. It became apparent, for example, that in the hearings that showed dramatic change — when disputants arrived hostile and left cooperative — the transition was seldom observable as a progression. Rather, they observed a single moment — the 'turning*

* Prof. Jannie Malan, Senior research consultant: African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), University of Durban-Westville.

point' or 'breakthrough' — in which the tone of the discussion changed, the atmosphere suddenly lightened, and hostility was supplanted by curiosity about the other disputant (Community Board Centre for Policy and Training 1986:3,8-9).

Factors contributing to such breakthroughs were then further investigated, and that led to some significant conclusions. From this example a few important inferences can be drawn:

- Data from real events of conflict and conflict resolution can and should be explored through research.
- This can be done by those practitioners who also have a talent for research, or jointly by practitioners and researchers.
- The findings of practice-oriented research can definitely improve the effectiveness of subsequent practical work.

Arguments and examples like these can induce practitioners to admit the practical value of research, and even to commit themselves to participate in research projects. The potential value of practical, experience-based observations, comments and suggestions from practitioners was emphasized at most of the regional workshops (Nieuwmeijer et al, 1995). However, the intentions and promises of practitioners are often overridden by a never-ending succession of time-consuming mediation jobs. Conflicts and their resolution cannot be postponed to convenient days, weeks of months, and so it usually is the research that has to wait for a constantly shifting date.

This very real and prevalent clash of commitments can obviously lead to hopeless frustration and forced neglect of research. Or it can be approached optimistically as an opportunity for creative problem solving.

One possible solution highlighted during the discussion (and the regional workshops, cf. Nieuwmeijer et al 1995) was to set up an appropriately designed database into which all possibly relevant information from the reports of practitioners could be entered. Once such a database was in operation it could be used for innumerable research projects. Knowledge about who was involved in what, and who specialized in what field, could be made available. Opportunities for meaningful discourse and networking could be created between researchers and practitioners.

However, such a "solution" would not be without its own problems. Confidentiality was an obvious difficulty. While some practitioners might have been willing to share some or all of their reports and case studies, others might have valid reasons for refusing to do so. Another problem was that too much research activity could not be expected from the overloaded practitioners themselves. The researchers would still have to initiate and facilitate research projects. They would have to go to the practitioners, discuss research needs with them and, where feasible, request them to write on particular topics.

Another possible solution which could be considered wherever there are such time or confidentiality constraints, is to invite mini-contributions from busy practitioners. It should be emphasized that research is not necessarily a matter of everything or nothing. Something meaningful can indeed be done by practitioners in the midst of their time-consuming activities (cf. Nieuwmeijer et al., 1995:60). As they are using their well-developed capacities for active

listening and observation, they may discover meaningful insights. Usually these will not only improve their understanding of the dispute they are currently dealing with, but will also become part of their expertise. The essence of such insights can be captured in a brief note and shared with other practitioners and with researchers. Examples of what can be sought and found are the following:

- Clues in expressions and body language that reveal underlying attitudes, perspectives, needs, interests, desires, problems, agendas and positions, as well as possible admissions, concessions, trade-offs and agreements.
- Hints about do's and don'ts at various stages of the entire process, from information gathering and social contextualizing through preparations for talks, beginning and continuation of talks, option generation and decision making, to eventual drafting, signing and implementation of agreements.
- Insights into family, neighbourhood and community involvement, stereotype and prejudice reduction, perception and attitude changes, caucus and feedback dynamics, relationship restoration and building.

Such a list of examples reminds us of the comprehensiveness and complexity of any process of conflict and its resolution. We should therefore have no illusions that the practitioners involved in such an extensive and challenging process will easily cope with the additional job of making notes for researchers. After all, their attention is inevitably focused on the specific problems of a particular situation. As they facilitate the interaction of the parties towards possible solutions, they may have little opportunity for more general thoughts and conclusions. They therefore need tactful encouragement and practical assistance. It should be made easy for ordinary practitioners to submit their modest but valuable contributions at local level (Nieuwmeijer *et al.*, 1995:25,27,46,59).

For instance, helpful, unpressurizing, practitioner-friendly checklists could be considered. Most of us may already have seen how a simple questionnaire can improve our abilities to observe and assess. For example, instead of just being generally satisfied with the service rendered by a shop, a few questions can help one identify what one really appreciates and why. If you are kindly invited to respond to a short list of items by simply marking yes/no or good/average/bad boxes, you are usually willing to spend a minute or two helping the shopkeepers to increase the quality of their service. In a similar way practitioners can be asked to mark possible answers or jot down key words with regard to some of the items listed above. It should be emphasized that they are under no obligation to complete the whole checklist, but that even a single item response will be appreciated.

Such an example of an accommodating attempt to elicit some response from practitioners is, of course, not supposed to mean that research can ever consist of a series of simple notes. It does mean, however, that overburdened practitioners should be prompted to share their valuable insights with researchers. It is then for dedicated researchers to assess, arrange and expand the material submitted and enter it on a relevant database. Where more clarity or more information is needed, interviews can be held with the practitioners or investigations of particular aspects can be organized. The hundreds of hours spent observing movement and relational contexts, are worthwhile because of the patterns which usually emerge.

During such extended periods of elaborate research, however, one should never lose sight of the real life situations in which the recommendations will eventually be implemented. The translation of research findings into understandable and implementable recommendations was also strongly advocated in most of the regional workshops (Nieuwmeijer et al., 1995). The people who will put the results of the research into practice will mainly be the busy practitioners. Massive volumes of difficult reading matter will be totally unusable for them. They will need a fairly brief synopsis of practical and practicable suggestions. This means that even if researchers are intent on producing impressive publications, they should also provide a helpful summary for the people who can test and use the new ideas in actual practice.

During the discussion at the workshop and also at more than one of the regional workshops, the necessity of demystifying and simplifying research was strongly emphasized (Nieuwmeijer et al., 1995). It was said that complicated versions of academic research should be counterbalanced and complemented by straightforward, practical research (Nieuwmeijer et al., 1995). Research should centre around that which can have a definite impact on the practical work of the practitioners. The concluding consensus at the end of the discussion was this:

- Researchers should indicate their interest in very practical, life-related research projects, and show their willingness to establish relationships, locally and regionally, with practitioners. Such a human network can then be supplemented by all the remarkable advantages of a technological database.

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3

FORGING A NEW BUREAUCRACY: GUIDELINES FOR RESEARCH ON CONFLICT RESOLUTION

FANIE CLOETE *

Towards the end of 1993, the now internationally famous negotiated settlement between opposing political forces in South Africa took place during the so-called CODESA negotiations at the World Trade Centre in Kempton Park. The settlement brought to an end one of the potentially most intractable violent conflicts in modern history. Analysts were surprised at the relative ease with which the political violence of the past was transformed into a negotiated political deal which resulted in a democratically elected Government of National Unity.

This relatively smooth transition to a new democratic state in South Africa has unfortunately not continued through the ensuing processes of transformation. The regime change agreed to at Kempton Park had significant implications for conflict management within the bureaucracy. There is now a dire need for substantial changes at normative, institutional and functional levels within the public service. This implies value changes from a closed, racially based and discriminatory system to an open, liberal democratic system that is more inclusive, egalitarian, responsive and participatory. At a structural level a need exists to rationalize four abolished black independent homeland states, six self-governing black states, three racial own-affairs administrations and four old provinces, into nine new streamlined provinces. Behaviourally a substantial redistribution of human, financial and other resources must take place (Cloete, 1995b:12).

At local level numerous racially based local authorities are in the process of being integrated into a dramatically reduced number of non-racial local government bodies. This rationalization process at all levels of government pursues stringent political, administrative and financial objectives, which intensifies the competition and conflict among incumbents and between incumbents and new applicants at all levels in the public sector.

This contribution identifies the main elements of this conflict and suggests some guidelines that can be fruitfully pursued to research possible avenues for better understanding and maybe even a resolution of this type of conflict.

* Prof. Fanie Cloete, Public Policy Analysis, School of Public Management, University of Stellenbosch.

What is the problem and who are involved?

As already suggested above, the structural integration and rationalization of various government institutions at all levels has been in progress since the 1994 national election, aimed at transforming an apartheid bureaucracy into a post-apartheid public service (Cloete & Mokgoro, 1995; Cloete, 1995a).

The main problem is that since 1948 the public service has developed into an organisation that fully supports the National Party regime which entrenched itself in the political sphere over about 40 years. It viewed the African National Congress (ANC) as the enemy and weeded out all supporters of it within the public service. In 1994 the ANC won the first post-apartheid democratic general election. Since then, it has initiated a process of "normalizing" the public service by appointing officials sympathetic to its views, especially in key positions. This has brought old-style apartheid officials into direct contact and frequently into conflict with newly appointed ANC sympathizers.

In this situation antagonism, obstructionism and a general lack of co-operation and communication were inevitable. This is exactly what happened. New officials in many cases refused point-blank to recognize and communicate with old incumbents whom they still regarded as fascist racists. In other cases old incumbents found it extremely difficult to work with people whom they had regarded until very recently as communist-inspired terrorists.

The new government's explicit affirmative action policy further stated clearly that promotion opportunities for old incumbents were not very good, and a number of new appointments were made over the heads of people who had high hopes of promotion. This new practice demoralized many old incumbents and raised conflict levels between old and new incumbents considerably (Cloete, 1995b).

In addition, the old apartheid bureaucracy was a bloated and dysfunctional body desperately in need of an overhaul. The process of rationalization is a painful one, which necessitates cuts in government spending. This automatically means a reduction in staff through not filling vacancies, retrenching staff and eventually abolishing posts. This situation has pitched all current and prospective bureaucrats headlong into a career battle for survival.

These factors all contribute to a situation where effective public service transformation is seriously hampered by intra-organizational conflicts.

Where is the problem ?

The problem is not only prevalent at central government level, but crops up at all levels of government. It is admittedly most intense at central level, but also happens provincially, especially in those provinces where the ANC achieved big majorities in the last national election, and consequently a changeover to new key staff has been initiated. In the Western Cape and in KwaZulu-Natal, where no regime change took place but where the old government continued to govern with minimum accommodation of the principles of a government of provincial unity, the problem was not as severe.

At local level, however, especially after the recent local community elections, many change-overs took place to ANC rule, not only from National Party (NP) dominated local councils but in some cases from Conservative Party (CP) and even "Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging"

(AWB) rule. This political power switch necessitates a concomitant restructuring of local bureaucracies to allow the new incumbent councillors to implement their new policies more effectively by trusted officials and not by former enemies. If this adaptation does not take place, it is arguable that the political legitimacy of the local elections will not be transferred to the new municipal administrations, and that the success of the Government of National Unity's Reconstruction and Development Programme will be seriously compromised.

Similar real and potential conflicts play themselves out, to a larger or lesser extent for the same reasons, among the current staff of parastatal bodies like universities, state enterprises, NGOs, etcetera, or between them and prospective newcomers to the organization concerned.

When and why does conflict occur?

Conflict between old and new government employees does not commence at a given moment. It is a continuation of the conflict that existed previously in a more intense form, when the respective parties were literally at war with each other. Naturally, when old and new incumbents meet and have to work together, or when it becomes clear that posts are scarce and that there will be winners and losers in the end, conflict either intensifies or starts afresh.

The last-mentioned competition for scarce resources is much easier to understand and deal with. It entails competition in terms of personal interests and can have a positive effect on performance and productivity as the competition heats up and staff members want to prove their worth compared to their competitors. In some cases, however, it can lead to demotivation and demoralization, especially if the uncertainty of what is going to happen to whom is drawn out for too long.

Conflict that occurs as a result of historically political antagonisms is more difficult to address. The basic underlying reason for this is probably the differences in value systems or ideologies (socialist vs capitalist and conservative vs liberal vs radical views). These different approaches to life and societal structuring can lead to a lack of knowledge and consequently understanding of an opponent's views and behaviour patterns. It can also lead to a dogmatic unwillingness or explicit refusal to try to find out more or to understand an opponent. In addition it normally leads to a total lack of trust and even perceptions of deliberate conspiracies against oneself, i.e. a continuation of the open conflicts that characterized the interaction between the respective groups until peace was formalized.

In addition to the ideological or normative dimensions of the conflict, organizational and cultural factors also play important roles. As stereotypes, individuals hailing from a technologically sophisticated, competitive, secular, Western, urban background have different approaches, customs and styles than their colleagues hailing from more laid-back agricultural or rural-oriented backgrounds, where myth and religion are more central aspects of daily life. It is a well-known cliche to describe South Africa as comprising strong elements of both a Western industrial economy and a lesser developed society. These differences also contribute to the conflict potential in the transition of the apartheid bureaucracy to a new post-apartheid public service.

It must be emphasized that not all relationships in the South African bureaucracy are conflictual. Many officials have either made the personal and professional transition to a new

paradigm successfully, or have tried hard to facilitate this change. They have done so out of personal conviction or because they realized there was no other way out of the deadlock situation that developed during the mid to late-1980s. Similarly there are individuals on the side of the various liberation movements who have also already made the switch successfully. These individuals are important resources to draw on in trying to regulate the conflict potential in the transitional public sector organizations.

How can this conflict be resolved, regulated or minimized?

If the above analysis of the causes of the latent and real conflicts within the current bureaucratic structures is accurate, the best way to deal with ideological conflicts is probably to instil a willingness in the minds of all officials to try to understand their opponents' points of view and to co-operate with them in building a new organization irrespective of their differences. This means the acceptance of a new mind set, a new approach to conflict and an acceptance of a common vision and mission for the organization, based on the co-operation of all employees in the pursuance of common interests. This approach will facilitate the creation of trust among former enemies and probably over time lead to the increasing acceptance of each other's *bona fides*; something that, in many cases, is totally lacking.

Strategies to facilitate the above changes of heart include a variety of mechanisms like team-building exercises, strategic planning sessions, brainstorming sessions, joint planning and management development sessions, collective orientation and training courses, etcetera. The full resources of good human resources management must be mobilized and used in an effective way to forge a new, more effective and integrated organization.

It must, however, also be accepted that some individuals will probably never change. In the appropriate cases, one can resort to more extreme measures like therapy sessions provided by the state or an organizational restructuring including early retirement, retrenchment, etcetera, as long as these strategies conform to fair labour practices.

In order to deal more effectively with conflict over scarce resources, it is important to create constructive opportunities for all employees to compete for existing resources in an attempt to pursue their careers and not to stifle the career opportunities of some on the basis of ascribed criteria alone. Various mechanisms to achieve these objectives are discussed in Cloete (1995b.)

When can or should the conflict be resolved?

It is important to attempt to resolve potential or real conflicts within an organization as soon as possible, to allow the organization to focus on its main strategic objectives unhindered by internal strife. At the same time, however, it should be remembered that the processes of social change are long term and cannot be fully achieved in the short or even medium term. The main reason for this is probably that consolidated social change comprises a substantial and durable transformation in dominant societal values, structures and processes not only within elite ranks in society, but also at mass levels (Cloete, 1994:102). This sometimes takes generations rather than decades to accomplish. In some cases conflict also seems to be an integral part of an institutional culture which cannot be resolved in any other way other than abolishing the organization concerned.

Research Implications

Nieuwmeijer, Du Toit and Sebulela (1995) have summarized the current (dismal?) state of the art regarding conflict management research in South Africa. They deal with the nature of the research process and conflict and peace research; the types of research which can and should be undertaken to fill the many voids in this regard; underlying assumptions about conflict and conflict resolution prevalent among researchers and practitioners in this field, and conclude with a summary of possibilities for research co-operation and a number of concrete recommendations to promote research in this field in South Africa.

The main research implications of their report, as well as the above preliminary conclusions, are probably that the issues which have been identified could serve as a basis, stimulus or even direction for further research. This research can verify, falsify or extend the relatively crude generalizations made here into more comprehensive and useful descriptive and prescriptive conclusions, hypotheses, principles, models and theories of conflict and conflict resolution. These would be based on the live laboratory experiment in this regard that makes up South African society.

Analytically it is important to distinguish clearly between the actors, values, institutions and processes involved; the manifestations of conflict; the causes of the conflict; the prospects and management mechanisms for conflict regulation, minimization or resolution; the time scales involved, and the variables that may influence these elements.

It is anticipated that this brief attempt at a systematic dissection of the complex phenomena of conflict and conflict resolution may contribute in the end to a more effective understanding and treatment of the disruptive elements of conflict at different levels and in different forms in the public sector.

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4

AFRICAN METHODS OF RESOLVING DISPUTES

JANNIE MALAN *

This topic is an important but controversial field of research. The question remains: are there distinctive African methods of dispute resolution or not? The influence of the practice of "African time" on negotiations such as lobola negotiations, still practised by so-called Westernized South Africans, make studies on this topic relevant and necessary. The object of studies on dispute resolution should be to enrich the knowledge of all forms of negotiation in South Africa and to celebrate in the progress. The following points underline the importance of exploring traditional and contemporary perspectives from Africa:

- The listening and learning attitude of many of the visiting conflict resolvers from abroad deserves due appreciation. When experts are reticent to explore this subject, they clearly communicate their modest reserve about their own expertise, (and their sincere willingness to contribute in a dialogical way to the development of home-bred models of conflict resolution in Africa).
- The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) committed itself to focus on research in "Conflict Resolution Wisdom from Africa", and to continue liaising with 80 African universities and maintaining consultation with the Conflict Management Division of the Organisation of African Unity.
- The initiative of South Africans as a Conflict Resolution Resource to Africa (SACCRA) in developing a directory of South African and African resources, establishing a network of partnerships, and exploring long-term capacity building also indicates the importance of this subject for South Africans.
- The first African Conference on Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution was held in Durban in March 1995. Delegates spoke frankly about all the problems which resulted when the international community imposed conflict interventions or aid missions. This became a problem when foreign officials were condescending and domineering. The discussion clearly showed the need for South Africans to explore their own inheritance in the field of conflict resolution.

* Prof. Jannie Malan, senior research consultant: African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), University of Durban-Westville.

Controversy over the subject

Controversy over studies on this topic is based on the following issues:

- The impossibility of generalizing when dealing with a continent of 53 countries and more than 800 languages;
- the difficulty of determining to what extent traditional methods, previously researched by socio-anthropologists, are still honoured by the contemporary descendants of the same peoples;
- the incongruence between an imported preoccupation with "scientific" analyses and approaches that are more oriented towards synthesizing surveys of social relationships;
- while most conflict resolution methods originating Africa seem to be based on talking, there are also some based on retaliation and even regulated fighting.

Perspectives on the relevance of the subject

Impressions about salient perspectives that have emerged from consultations, observations and publications indicate the following:

- Methods developed in Africa all seem to take the social context seriously. When the background of a conflict is explored, important clues can indeed be found in family, neighbourhood or community relationships. During talks the constituency of each negotiating team can wield considerable influence. When an agreement has been reached, the social environment can play an important part in ensuring that the parties implement their promises.
- Another commonality apparently found in methods used in Africa is an attitude of togetherness. As with any other statement on attitude, of course, this one can never be unambiguously substantiated. It is always difficult to identify an attitude decisively and to distinguish a genuine attitude from a feigned one. Observers and researchers with an attitudinal interest however, do come across convincing indications of this orientation towards a side-by-side, shoulder-to-shoulder togetherness (Malan, 1994:348-352; Kritzinger, 1995). Signs of this spirit can be seen in preferences for neighbourhood mediators or mediating teams, and especially in the concern for how parties will live together after their conflict has been resolved.

Arguments against African conflict resolution models

Different viewpoints were emphasised during the discussion at the workshop. Several arguments were raised against a preoccupation with conflict resolution models from Africa:

- It is unfair to label all imported models as exclusivist First World creations. The typical American model, for instance, is also based on research into indigenous methods.
- South African conflict resolution practitioners from a political activist background seem to be quite comfortable with the current models.

- Methods from the past should not be romanticized, but should rather be assessed in the light of changed circumstances, such as urbanization and interaction with people from neighbouring countries.
- Research into models from Africa can have the severe disadvantage of reviving and reinforcing racial stereotypes, especially when "culture" is used as a euphemism for "race". After all, Africa is not necessarily the only place where the social context and the attitude of togetherness are taken seriously, or where strangers are frowned upon as mediators.

Arguments for African conflict resolution models

On the other hand, however, arguments were raised in favour of an unprejudiced receptivity to lessons from conflict resolving approaches used in the past and/or the present in Africa:

- The approach that focuses on inclusivity, communality, collectivity and humanity may not be unique to Africa, but is a definite reality in Africa.
- This orientation towards people has not only informed traditional conflict resolution patterns in the past, but is still valued in the changed circumstances of the present.
- More is needed than simply separating a problem from the people concerned. The people should be put first, by making them realize that they do matter and that they are heard. This obviously applies to all the parties involved in a conflict.
- Any attentive observer in South Africa should be able to discern a strong resistance to Western methods of conflict resolution, especially in circles where traditional leadership and/or civic organizations are taken seriously.
- This resistance is one of the apparent explanations for the emergence of the complex phenomenon of people's courts. These courts, also disparagingly called "kangaroo courts", should not be seen as a revival of African tradition, but rather as a mutation thereof. They can also be understood as a result of the struggle to regain the humanhood of which many have been deprived by structural violence.
- Sensitivity is needed to understand cultural specifics, such as relations with ancestors and relations within family and social networks.

Conclusion

Very tentatively, therefore, the implicit conclusions of this open-ended discussion can be stated as follows:

- Research into the variety of traditional, and especially contemporary, methods of conflict resolution from various parts of Africa should be encouraged, provided that it is undertaken with the necessary sensitivity and with as much honest and critical thinking as possible.
- Relationships, attitudes and the real needs of people in their communities should be taken seriously.

- Such research should indicate where particular refinements or modifications of current methods of conflict resolution could be considered for various parts of Africa, and in particular for South Africa.

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5

MEDIATION OF FAMILY CONFLICT

HUGO VAN DER MERWE *

Family mediation is developing into an established, recognized field of specialization in South Africa. The incorporation of family mediation concepts and processes which were recognized in the establishment of the Office of the Family Advocate, are now receiving increased recognition by the Department of Justice. It is also being more widely embraced by clients and communities who are frustrated by the traditional (Western) adversarial approach to divorce and other family disputes.

Research in the field of family mediation is sadly lacking. Debates about crucial policy issues are only beginning to emerge from behind the academic curtain. As mediation becomes a realistic alternative to all sections of South African society, the various policy issues will be hotly debated. The lack of empirical research in the field will, however, stunt the level of debate. The following essay is an attempt to sketch a research agenda that would facilitate informed decision making and to highlight some of these policy questions. To do this effectively, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of family conflict and mediation services.

Types of family conflict

Family conflict is a very broad arena. It can be categorized according to various subtypes, each with its own distinctive patterns, which necessitate different sets of skills and procedures from service providers. The primary subcategories are:

- Conflict between partners (for example divorce, spousal abuse, custody and maintenance);
- parent-child conflict ranging from adolescent to adult children (for example abuse and neglect, disrespect, discipline and responsibilities, political and religious values);
- sibling conflict (for example over inheritances, care of parents, household responsibilities, care of younger siblings), and
- family feuds: combinations of the above issues.

Service providers

Family disputes affect white and black, poor and rich families. There are many commonalities in the types of problems encountered, but also different patterns, options and solutions. While access to services is largely determined by wealth, there is a general sense that existing services are unsatisfactory and inappropriate even for those who can afford it.

* Hugo van der Merwe, Community Dispute Resolution Trust: Johannesburg.

The field of family mediation in South Africa has developed in a very segmented fashion. Different initiatives were established to deal with different segments of the population. To some extent this is a result of the racial divides established by the apartheid legal system: separate courts and laws for different race groups. There is, however, also a financial differentiation between those who can afford professional fees on the one hand and those who depend on government, non-government and informal services on the other.

Research projects have similarly focused on different sectors of the population. One problem highlighted by various researchers was the lack of integration of the various dispute resolution services. There is indeed very little understanding of who is doing what. The achievements, strengths and weaknesses of the various sectors have to be recognised and integrated into a more holistic service network.

The broad sectors that do have a role in resolving family conflict are:

- Courts and other state structures;
- Private practitioners;
- Non-government organizations (NGOs), university-based services and social welfare institutions;
- Community-based organisations (CBOs);
- Traditional authorities.

These sectors are not absolute categories with distinct boundaries. Various organizations operate in more than one sector.

Courts and other state structures

State assistance in the arena of family conflict is provided mainly through the courts and the Department of Social Welfare. The courts, primarily through the introduction of the Office of the Family Advocate in 1990, have introduced some ground-breaking initiatives regarding mediation. The Family Advocate settles disputes of custody and access. While he/she monitors all cases involving minor children, the Family Advocate intervenes only in very particular cases.

The legislation and rules that outline the functions of the Family Advocate have been criticized for not making proper use of mediation procedures. Mediation is in fact not defined by the Act. The "purity" of the mediation used by the Family Advocate has been questioned for a number of reasons, arising largely from its role in providing a range of overlapping services on behalf of the courts.

There is a concern that the intervention of the Family Advocate is not voluntary, that the process can be intimidatory because of the need to establish facts, and that it is not a neutral approach because it has to make judgements about the parenting abilities of the parties. Furthermore, the mediator is put in the position of proposing solutions and making a judgement if the parties fail to agree.

Mediation of a more informal type is sometimes found in the magistrate's divorce courts (generally termed the "Black Divorce Courts"). The clerk of the court is often put in the

position of attempting to assist a divorcing couple to reach agreement on custody and other related issues.

Social workers in provincial structures are also often involved in this arena, sometimes through court referrals and sometimes as a result of other intervention requests. Court referrals occur particularly in cases where the parties disagree about custody and the magistrate requests further information before making a decision. While social workers are assigned to do background investigations and report their recommendations, they sometimes get the parties to come to some agreement that is then accepted by the magistrate.

Most of the services available through state structures are of questionable quality. A clear role for mediation is not defined by the law, conflicting demands are made by different roles placed on these officials, and training in mediation skills is sadly lacking. Some efforts have been made to train government social workers, and the Family Advocate's Office has made significant efforts to secure proper skills for their staff.

Burman and Rudolph (1990) present a serious indictment of mediation efforts by South African court and social welfare officials who are inadequately trained and part of a system that does not protect the rights of the parties. The establishment of family courts presents an opportunity to rectify some of these problems.

Serious problems of accessibility (geographic, financial, language, etcetera.) of government (as well as other services) are discussed in a separate section.

Private practitioners

Private family mediators operate mainly in the field of divorce mediation, largely because that is where the main market for their services exists. The fees charged by these practitioners make them inaccessible to a large portion of the population. Private practitioners also tend to be drawn largely from white and middle-class sectors of South African society, leaving most disadvantaged communities without a local skills base. While there are probably about 500 trained divorce mediators in South Africa, there has not been a sufficient demand for their services. The individual successes achieved by these practitioners are, however, notable. They experience high settlement rates, and very high levels of satisfaction. Research done in other countries on similar mediation models has also revealed very good results.

NGOs, university-based advice services and welfare institutions

Non-government organisations, university-based services and welfare institutions have filled an important gap in terms of providing highly skilled services (sometimes through the use of volunteers) either free of charge or at minimal cost to communities that otherwise have very little access to the law or to effective dispute resolution procedures. The accessibility, acceptability and appropriateness of their services have increased the level of service provision considerably.

Records kept by these organizations are an important primary source of information for research, though not much analysis has been done.

Community-based organisations (CBOs)

Community-based organizations are often overlooked by government structures as important role players in the resolution of family disputes. Advice centres, justice centres and community-based paralegal organizations are important legal resources for marginalized communities. The main strength of these structures is that they operate in close co-operation with their communities. Moreover, they are perceived as accessible and responsive to community concerns.

Another community-based approach is that of the people's courts. While the model of dispute resolution in these courts has generally been more adjudicatory, they have settled many family disputes such as maintenance and parent-child relations.

Community-based organizations also play an important role in educating communities about the law and their rights, and have also mobilized communities to lobby for change. South Africa has a serious legacy of fear and distrust regarding the judicial system. CBOs serve as important links to bridge the gap between the courts and the communities. They are, however, severely constrained by a lack of resources. The change in government has presented a difficult funding situation for community-based structures as historical funding sources (mainly international donors) have withdrawn much of their support and the government has been slow to fill the gap.

Traditional authorities

Lastly, various traditional structures still play a very important part in regulating and mediating family disputes. Even where formal traditional structures no longer exist, informal processes have emerged to assist in cases of marital and other family disputes. The legal position of these authorities presently hangs in the balance. Their location and significance in relation to rural communities is vital, but their political, legal and constitutional status is being questioned (particularly with regard to gender composition and gender values that they impose).

Suggestions for a research agenda and policy questions

Research needs and policy questions can be broadly categorized into four areas:

- Prevalence, patterns and causes (psychological, cultural and structural);
- Conflict behaviour;
- Access to intervention services;
- Appropriate intervention approaches.

Prevalence, patterns and causes (psychological, cultural and structural)

Intervention efforts in family disputes need to be guided by an understanding of the broader factors impacting on the family, as well as the intrapersonal problems that feed into family problems.

Proper statistics on family conflict (family violence, divorce, child abuse, family murders, etcetera.) need to be made available in order to develop an understanding of the extent of the

problem. Such information should be analysed in terms of various social indicators (for example, racial classification, gender, income level, geographic location, level of education, employment and level of social and economic infrastructure) in order to provide some broad indications of the social factors which impact on these phenomena.

More in-depth analyses are also needed to provide a link between the various cultural and religious values and norms which impact on family interaction. While much has been written about a culture of violence, there is a limited understanding of the links between the violence-ridden political and criminal society that has developed and the violence that occurs within the family. The patriarchal values embedded in our various cultures and social institutions are also not sufficiently understood in terms of family relations. As these values and norms change even more conflict can be expected.

It is also necessary to develop an understanding of the cost of conflict for the individual and society. Conflict is not simply an event. It is a process of underlying tension that sometimes erupts in an act of violence that may then be too late to address.

Conflict behaviour

We need to examine what the common ("normal") reactions to a conflict situation are: What do people do when confronted with a family conflict? When do they react with violence, when do they confront the other person, how do they confront and when do they simply ignore or avoid the problem?

The role of external parties in conflict should be examined: How effectively do people manage conflict on their own and when do they seek outside assistance? What role do family and other personal support structures play? Whom do people turn to when these networks are not available? What factors determine these choices? Are they culturally prescribed or are these personal life skills that could be taught to anybody?

Some research on these matters indicates that (in African communities at least, but most likely to some extent in other communities as well) family members are very reluctant to involve outsiders in family disputes. The first option (and very much the preferred approach) is the assistance of the extended family (and sometimes close friends). Outside professionals or public institutions are only relied upon when the situation becomes desperate (either when this network fails or when the problem is so serious it requires more stringent remedies) (Van der Merwe and Mbebe, 1994). Even though the family network may be seen as the appropriate mediation or conciliator forum, it may not be trusted to be neutral by an aggrieved wife in certain cases because of gender biases (Nina et al., 1995).

In order to devise appropriate intervention strategies and services, these dynamics need to be understood in much greater detail.

Access to intervention services

The lack of access to justice in South Africa is clearly reflected in the area of family and divorce services. Social welfare services, legal aid assistance and dispute resolution services are all severely lacking. The dimensions of these problems must, however, be assessed and analysed in more detail. The range of government, NGO, CBO, and private services are not well

catalogued or integrated. Disputants are hard-pressed to identify what services (if any) are available to them. Not only does the public not know their legal rights, they have little comprehension regarding how these rights can be pursued. Referral processes for existing services, for example, are very limited.

Access to intervention services depends on a range of factors. To a large extent it is determined by income, language, culture, geographic location (urban, rural, provincial), racial classification and gender. The impacts of all these factors need to be examined in greater detail as different types of services are diversely affected by different variables.

The question of access is also partially one of acceptability - cultural and political. The acceptability of the intervention of outsiders is partially one of culture, but is also determined by political connotations of these outside institutions. How have political changes, for example, affected the acceptability of courts, police and state services? Are they still seen as white-dominated and politically suspect by various communities?

The reason why people use a service needs to be understood. There are both "push" and "pull" factors, some political and some related to the appropriateness of the approach to the particular problem.

Appropriate intervention approaches

Competing points of view about appropriate approaches to resolving family conflict are hotly contested. Mediation, or particular models or styles of mediation, are criticized from a range of perspectives. Unresolved issues include the appropriateness of mediation to particular cases, the linkage between mediation and litigation, the impact of mediation on parties' legal rights, the cultural assumptions of specific mediation models, appropriate qualifications for mediators, and the specific role and tactics of mediators.

What are appropriate forums and processes for different types of disputes? Mediation is not a magical cure for all problems. Formal legal processes are more suitable if one wants to guarantee a certain measure of equality among the parties. Mediation is also not a process that can provide public censure or set precedents. There is therefore much controversy around the question of whether mediation should even be considered in cases of spousal abuse. Certain family disputes may have to be treated as criminal matters to endorse public rejection of domestic violence and to create a disincentive for certain forms of behaviour. Creative utilization may, however, be made of combining adjudicative and mediation approaches, and adapting mediation in ways that overcome the power imbalances.

The integration of different family dispute resolution services is, however, not a simple matter. Should mediation of divorce and family mediation occur under the courts' umbrella, or would this alienate the services from local communities who have greater faith in independent professionals and community-based services? Would such court annexation distort the culturally sensitive and intimate nature of mediation processes? If they are not subsumed by the courts, maybe such services could build a close partnership that combines the legal protections offered by the courts (for weaker parties, particularly women and children) with the benefits of mediation.

Rather than simply relying on the courts to protect the weaker party, mediation should also address the problem of power imbalances very seriously. How may mediation compromise the legal rights of parties? What strategies can be used to correct power imbalances? The types of power imbalances that occur need to be more carefully explored, for example, knowledge of the law, access to finances, emotional manipulation and threats of physical abuse. All of these impact on a party's ability to pursue his or her interests. It is important to determine which issues can (and cannot) be dealt with in the mediation process.

The model of mediation used by the state structures, private practitioners and NGOs in South Africa is based mainly on Western prototypes. How these models are suited to the cultures, social problems and legal context of South Africa needs to be problematised. For example, what assumptions do they make regarding South African value systems, interaction styles and the social constraints acting on parties in dispute? How can these models be adapted or more suitable processes rebuilt using our local knowledge base and experience? Such questions need to be asked in a broader context which identifies the type of process used, the identity of any third party, the relevant stakeholders who should be involved in the resolution process, the gender and age-related identities and roles of parties, the value system that impacts on appropriate dispute behaviour and outcomes pursued (for example, how strong a bias is there towards reconciliation rather than separation in cases of potential divorce?).

One issue that will soon become (and already to some extent is) fiercely contested is that of qualifications and accreditation. Who are the most appropriate mediators of family disputes and which service providers should the government endorse? Informal or lay-mediators are often more accepted and practical, but they are stymied by their lack of state recognition. This is partially a result of a necessary process of quality control (ensuring that parties are given adequate services), but it is also a matter of "turf". As family mediation services become incorporated into state court and welfare services the battle for accreditation will become more heated. While there will be a need to ensure that mediators are capable and adequately trained, there will be pressure from various quarters to exclude those who do not have formal training.

Mediation is coming of age at both the international and domestic levels. The path of family mediation in South Africa is, however, uncharted and contentious. Without adequate research, these arguments will simply be settled through a power struggle between different stakeholders, rather than on the basis of a thorough understanding of the needs of family members.

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6

RESOLVING CONFLICT IN COMMUNITIES IN SOUTH AFRICA

GAVIN BRADSHAW *

The aim of this chapter is to set community conflict against the backdrop of protracted social conflict in the country. Because of the lack of clarity surrounding terminology, some attention is also given to this aspect. This is followed by a discussion of the development of a South African approach to community conflict resolution, with special emphasis on the role played by the National Peace Accord. In the wake of the democratic elections of April 1994, concerted, nationwide efforts to resolve conflict have been shelved, despite the persistence of the structural prerequisites for community conflict within the context of protracted social conflict. Democracy has been hard won in South Africa, but its fabric remains weak and it would be a great shame to see it fail due to a lack of attention to a parallel process of conflict resolution.

Social conflict in South Africa

South Africa is one of the countries in the world that continues to experience extremely high levels of violent conflict. The occurrence of violent conflict during the years of apartheid was understandable. Enforced minority rule generated its own opposition. Its manifestations, however, were not always explicable in terms of conventional analysis, identifying parties with conflicting interests, and then explaining behaviour in rational and strategic terms. By far the greatest amount of violent conflict took place within black communities, who were all equally the victims of the apartheid system.

Between 1990 and 1994 high levels of conflict persisted, and this is perhaps also not surprising. During an era of transition, it stands to reason that there will be competition among groups as some groups position themselves to gain an advantage from the new political arrangements, and other groups attempt to defend their positions and limit the costs of the transition to themselves.

In the immediate post-election period South Africa experienced a brief period of calm.

There were great hopes that the worst of our troubles were over. Unfortunately that period was short-lived, and the incidence of violence has almost returned to the pre-election levels. While the province of KwaZulu-Natal continues to experience particularly high levels of violence, it is not restricted to that region. What can we expect in the near future?

* Gavin Bradshaw, Department of Political Studies: University of Port Elizabeth.

As the new government restructures the civil service, the police and the military, extreme tensions are likely to be generated as personalities jockey for positions. Development projects undertaken in terms of the government's Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) are also likely to generate further conflict as certain communities are targeted for benefits, and others are left in the cold. This is likely to be exacerbated by the injection of substantial but hopelessly insufficient development assistance from abroad, thereby increasing the competition for these resources.

Protracted Social Conflict in South Africa

The South African conflict is best understood in terms of the Protracted Social Conflict (PSC) model of Edward Azar (1990).

In terms of this model, conflict is extremely difficult to resolve, because it is multifaceted and displays the following features:

- First and foremost, conflict has a significant communal element, in that it normally occurs in societies which can be regarded as multi-communal (on ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious grounds) and in which these communal elements become highly politicized.
- Conflict is also largely characterized by the frustration of important human psychological and material needs, as understood in the work of John Burton (1984).
- Protracted Social Conflict is also characterized by authoritarian government, and the inability of government to adequately provide goods and services on an equitable basis. In Azar's own words:

  > *Most states which experience protracted social conflict tend to be characterized by incompetent, parochial, fragile and authoritarian governments that fail to satisfy basic human needs (1990:10).*

- The fourth characteristic of Protracted Social Conflict is that it tends to occur in states that are internationally dependent to a great degree. That dependency results in pressures that skew the state's delivery to its internal constituencies even further.

The PSC model seems almost tailor-made to the South African situation. Indeed, two of the most prominent proponents of the model, John Burton and Edward Azar, frequently cite South Africa as a typical example.

The multicultural nature of South African society is well known and needs no elaboration. The apartheid system also is an excellent and well-known example of an authoritarian government manipulating multiculturalism in order to distribute the benefits of government in an extremely unequal way. This has given rise to a massive denial of fundamental human needs. As Azar predicts, such a needs frustration is likely to give rise to the concentration on a need for participation - again borne out in the South African context. The final aspect of Protracted Social Conflict is once more supported with reference to South Africa. South Africa has an "open" economy with a great dependence on trade. The conflict in South Africa was also exacerbated by the South African government's aggressive anti-communism, the consequent development of an ideological dimension to the conflict, and the export of that conflict to the entire southern African region.

The overriding aspect of Protracted Social Conflict is that it is extremely difficult to resolve. I will show below how this can be successfully attempted.

Resolving deep-rooted or Protracted Social Conflict

When social conflict has become protracted, the use of conventional dispute resolution mechanisms seems hopelessly inadequate. Attempts to settle disputes by negotiation, whether mediated or not, are extremely short-lived, if they are successful at all.

There are a number of reasons for this:

- Firstly, conflict has become a way of life in certain areas, and it can be said that a culture of violence has developed. New incidents therefore take place continually. If they are not dealt with immediately, they give rise to renewed cycles of violence.
- Secondly, communication within political organizations is often poor. Although party leadership often exhorts its followers to peace, these messages have frequently not filtered down to the rank and file, and so conflictual relations persist on the ground.
- Identities have also become bound up in violent conflict. Many, especially the youth, have begun to define themselves in terms of their conflict roles.
- The frustrated needs of parties seem never to be addressed, even well after the establishment of a legitimate, democratically elected government.

Dealing with conflict of this nature requires a longer-term perspective, and intervention that is ongoing, constantly adapting to the specific needs of the parties. Intervention becomes, in a sense, permanent. Conceptually, what is required can best be termed a conflict management system. We can define a conflict management system (CMS) as follows:

> *It is a permanent, rather than a once-off intervention, which is substantially "owned" by the parties to the conflict. It includes structures or institutions, and ongoing activities in pursuit of peace. It should be self-sustaining and accessible to the community at the point of need. Because conflicts shift and change, the CMS needs also to change and grow, constantly adapting to the needs of the changing conflict. The system should have built-in procedures for accessing resources, especially expertise and opportunities for planning (Bradshaw, 1994a:4).*

Many of the difficulties relating to social conflict in South Africa cry out for a systemic approach. Again and again research indicates that as apartheid was a holistic, total strategy, so the conflict management response needs to be equally holistic. As the past reflects structural violence, so the present reflects a need for structural approaches to peace-making which take all of the aspects of the conflict into account.

Practically speaking, what South Africa needs is an approach which addresses conflict, not simply at the national level, but in the decentralized communities around the country, where conflict behaviour is at its most destructive. This can be accomplished by a CMS which also has the ability to communicate the undertakings (in terms of the National Peace Accord) to the grassroots, where wars often continued unabated despite promises of peace at national level.

Community conflict resolution: towards some conceptual clarification

One can agree with Sparkes (1994:2-10) that it is unnecessary to be able to provide a comprehensive definition of a phenomenon before one is able to discourse intelligibly on the topic. Nevertheless it is helpful before embarking on a discussion on a specific topic, such as community conflict, to provide some clarification of the central terms, at least as one is intending to use them in one's own arguments. Furthermore, community conflict is a term that is used particularly loosely in the South African context. As a result it tends to have as many meanings as there are authors on the subject. It has become a kind of intellectual shorthand, which means anything the speaker wishes it to mean.

According to the Oxford English Dictionary, as quoted by Sparkes (1994: 24,25), the "community" means "the persons belonging to a place, or constituting a particular concourse, congregation, company or class". The word also has a definite link to the German *Gemeinschaft*, which implies a sense of belonging, based on kinship or affection.

In its South African political usage, the term "community" often refers to black South Africans, perhaps making it the latest in a long line of euphemisms coined to lump people together on racial grounds in this country.

When referred to in the conflict context, community is again used in ways that are not always consistent with a single meaning. It is often used, for instance, to refer to a catch-all category of conflict manifestations that do not fall into other categories, such as environmental conflict, family or commercial disputes. More specifically, it is often used to simply indicate any species of conflict which is distinct from industrial relations.[1]

As used by this author, community conflict refers to social conflict that manifests itself in a specific locality or residential area as opposed to the workplace.

The issues in community conflict typically include a very wide range. Development, underdevelopment, lack of services, costs of services, environmental degradation, taxi competition and many other issues often influence conflict in communities. Family or domestic conflict are deliberately omitted and the focus is on conflict with a public dimension. In so far as most of the communities where conflict takes on serious proportions are those most damaged by apartheid, the majority of cases examined involve African communities. This need not necessarily be the case, however.

Although manifest in a specific locality, community conflict cannot simply be treated in isolation from the wider, national conflict, which has ramifications throughout South African society. National conflicts must therefore constantly be borne in mind when dealing with community conflict. This link between community conflict and Protracted Social Conflict is alluded to above and is reinforced throughout the chapter.

There is also a need for a conceptual clarification of the term "conflict resolution", as a distinct from "conflict settlement". This distinction affects our ability to intervene successfully in conflict.

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1. See, for instance, Steadman (1993) and Anstey (1993) for such usage.

"Settlement" is a term which in conflict literature, implies the immediate and short-term agreement to end hostilities. In his discussion on two paradigms of understanding conflict, Burton (1987:111-116) asserts that while conflicts are often settled by coercive means, they are never resolved by such means. The implication is that resolution is a longer term, more thorough process than settlement - one that is durable because it has the fundamental support of the conflicting parties.

Typically, settlement will deal with the stated positions of the parties or immediate causes, which are only symptoms of the deeper, underlying causes. Additionally, it requires only that parties make short-term compromises. Settlement is also characterized by intervention, which entails the entrance of a "neutral" third party, followed by a settlement and the subsequent exit of the third party. This model is widely and successfully applied in First World contexts where political legitimacy is usually high and the institutions of the state are well developed.

Conflict resolution, on the other hand, means a more or less permanent solution to a conflict. Because of its longer-term approach, conflict resolution enables and empowers the parties at all times. It provides ongoing logistical and moral support and is more likely to provide a durable solution.

The literature on Protracted Social Conflict, as discussed earlier, demands attempts at resolution rather than settlement, precisely because it is protracted, and because of the often violent and costly manifestations of such conflict.

An inclusion of judicial or quasi-judicial processes as examples of conflict resolution, as done by Steadman (1993:126-128) is not in keeping with the definition of community conflict resolution. The reason is that judicial processes limit the participation of parties to very narrowly defined roles. Furthermore, such processes rely heavily on coercion to sustain their outcomes. The parties are very much the objects of the process, rather than its subjects.

A South African approach to community conflict resolution

There is a developing literature on South African approaches to community conflict settlement and resolution in the country. Steadman (1993), Anstey (1993) and Bradshaw *et al.* (1991) all list approaches to intervention in community conflict. Much of the material was produced during the late eighties and early nineties and concentrates on the role played by the structures of the peace accord in conflict resolution, the establishment of community dispute resolution centres, (such as that in Alexandra, inspired by the efforts of Paul Pretorius (Steadman, 1993:128,129) and conflict management systems (Bradshaw *et al.* 1991).

There is a common realization in most of this work that community conflict resolution in South Africa requires its own processes. Research conducted by a consortium of organizations in 1990 and 1991 indicated the need for a South African approach to community conflict resolution (Bradshaw *et al.* 1991)

They found that community's experience began with feelings of exclusion and perceived powerlessness. Any conflict intervention first had to be consultative and empowering. This research process also depended on consultation and came from an assumption that empowerment was a high priority.

The fact that communities experience conflict as endemic - that is, conflict existing at every level of community and society - suggests that communities need approaches to conflict resolution that are holistic, systemic and systematic. A "systems design" for handling community conflict should therefore be considered.

Whether or not "community conflict" was a helpful or appropriate concept was an open question when the pilot project (Bradshaw *et al.* 1991) began. The findings of the project indicated that communities were determined to establish community identity as a priority. This validates the view of the community as a specific party to particular conflicts, and as a unit of analysis for understanding and handling a variety of conflicts.

Some of the communities involved in the project included people and groups who had been traumatized for years by violence, repression and conflict. Conflict handling processes could theoretically require people to act rationally, but this may not be possible for people and communities that have been dehumanized. Therefore, any conflict resolution system has to make provisions for reconciliation, rehumanization and therapy.

The most damaging legacy of apartheid, which intentionally kept people separated physically, socially and psychologically, is clearly the difficult relationships between people, communities and authorities, within and between groups and within and between organizations. The dysfunctional relationships central to most community conflicts require that communities acquire skills and processes for relationship analysis. There are a variety of frameworks within which such analyses can be facilitated. The project makes one basic assumption: when relationships are analysed and parties recognize interdependencies and needs or desires for ongoing relationships are present, there are strong incentives for using co-operative rather than adversarial processes for problem-solving, negotiation and communication. Adversarial conflict handling processes are sometimes appropriate, but most often within the context of "one-off" relationships where the substantive outcome is more important than the ongoing value of the relationship.

Beyond this initial level of relationship analysis, there is the opportunity to recognize the complexities of primary and secondary relationships; to consider the possibility of transforming non-valued relationships into valued relationships, dysfunctional ones into functional relationships, or on improving working relationships. Various conflict handling skills and techniques rely on the presupposition that relationship building is desirable and empowering for both or all parties to a conflict.

Feedback from workshop participants (during the pilot project) suggested that the activity they found most useful was the facilitated analysis of various situations and circumstances of conflict. As with consultation, the parallel between the research process and a conflict resolution process was critical. In order to be empowered, community decision making and leadership structures need to have skills and methods for reflecting on conflict and conflict handling experiences. It was clear that many people had experienced negotiations as unhelpful.

Negotiated outcomes had not proved durable in many cases. In others, people were not prepared to invest in relationships with their negotiating partners. Frameworks offered by conflict resolution theory, especially when facilitated by intervenors or resource persons

familiar with those theories and processes, can create tremendous understanding and valuable reflection, which can impact on future planning for conflict handling.

During the time when communities are being empowered and developing and institutionalizing community resources for conflict handling, they should have access to facilitators who can assist in conflict analysis, relationship analysis, and process observations and analysis.

The role of these facilitators is multi-dimensional. They can workshop and train community structures in skills; they can serve as mediators; they can act as process observers, working to the benefit of both or all sides in a conflict handling initiative; or they can act as researchers and monitors.

These findings clearly accord with the theory of Protracted Social Conflict and suggest conflict management systems as appropriate forms of intervention into community conflict in South Africa. An example would be one of the most impressive conflict management systems on a national scale designed and implemented by the South African political leadership. Its greatest impact was on the lives of people living in violence-racked communities around the country.

The South African National Peace Accord (NPA)

When levels of violence in South Africa became so high that it was feared that they threatened the national negotiations on an interim constitution for the country, the most important parties signed a National Peace Accord on 14 September 1991. The signing of the peace accord and the establishment of the various structures represents one of the most ambitious domestic conflict resolution endeavours ever attempted. It can be described as a conflict management system for the following reasons:

- The NPA included structures at a number of levels, and in decentralized locations throughout the country.
- It was, for the most part, painfully sensitive to the wishes of all of its constituent parties; in this sense, they "owned" the NPA.
- It was a long-term intervention into social conflict at a vast number of different levels in the country.
- It envisaged three different types of conflict limitation activities: peace-keeping, peace-building and peace-making. In the course of events, most of the emphasis fell on the peace-keeping and peace-making functions (Nossel and Shaer, 1992).

The structures of the National Peace Accord

The structures of the NPA are as follows:

The National Peace Secretariat (NPS) administers and co-ordinates the entire project. It consists of the representatives of four of the most important signatories at the national level, being: The African National Congress (ANC), the National Party (NP), the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the Democratic Party (DP). The NPS was chaired by Dr A. Gildenhuys and employed a number of administrative officials, many of whom were secondments from the

private sector, as well as from government departments, particularly the Department of Justice.

The National Peace Committee consisted of representatives of all the parties signatory to the accord, as well as church and business representatives. The full National Peace Committee met only once, at the inception of the National Peace Accord. Theoretically, it stands at the apex of a structure of peace committees, established at regional and local levels. Eventually, 11 Regional Peace Committees (at first called Regional Dispute Resolution Committees) were established and 263 Local Peace Committees. The regional peace committees were serviced by the National Peace Secretariat at the national level, as well as by regional office staff. The function of the local and regional committees was to bring conflicting parties together to try and prevent violence and maintain peace.

The Commission of Inquiry into the prevention of public violence and intimidation was established as the third leg of the peace structures. The commission was chaired by Mr Justice R.J. Goldstone. Its main function was to investigate incidents of public violence and intimidation, to uncover the perpetrators of such violence and counter-recriminations, and to bring this information to the attention of the Peace Committee. The Goldstone Commission, as it became known, was also given a regional presence through its reporting officers (mainly lawyers) situated in the eleven "peace committee" regions of the country.

Peace Accord activities

The activities of the Peace Accord have been many and varied. A summary of the more typical activities which took place under the auspices of the regional and local peace committees is provided below.

- Committee activities: Conflict analysis and decision making with regard to conflict intervention, peace-building, structures maintenance, organizing peace days, etcetera.
- Monitoring activities: Monitoring of political activity of all kinds - protests, meetings, elections.
- Intervention activities: Mediation and facilitation of all kinds of conflict situations, by peace secretariat staff, peace committee members and outside experts.
- Training activities: Team-building, needs assessment, training of Peace Committees in conflict handling skills, including conflict analysis, mediation/ facilitation and negotiation skills. Training of monitors in a wide range of skills, including radio operation, first aid, basic intervention etcetera. Training office staff in administration etcetera.
- Socio-economic reconstruction and development (SERD) activities: Facilitation of development-related conflicts by linking communities to service providers and other resources.

- Marketing activities: Media liaison, organizing Peace Day activities, distributing T-shirts, buttons, stickers, flags, etcetera.

The greatest achievements of the Peace Accord

Many observers of the South African political scene have said that the Peace Accord and its structures were not a great success. They point out that if one examines the statistics on violence in the country immediately before the establishment of the accord, and compare these with the statistics on the period after the implementation of the accord, there is no noticeable decline in the number of deaths and violent incidents. If anything the trend is in the opposite direction. Unfortunately an unsophisticated analysis of statistics can prove to be misleading. One needs to take into account the large number of incidents of public protest during the period after the establishment of the accord, and the degree of public disillusionment after the breakdown of Constitutional Development of South Africa (CODESA), and in the wake of the death of Chris Hani. Given the history of conflict in South Africa, the breakdown of relationships and the degree of inequality that exists, certain accomplishments assume the proportions of miracles.

The peaceful election of April 1994 is one of a number of successes due largely to the work of the Peace Accord. When the CODESA negotiations broke down in mid-1992, many observers close to the process expressed the opinion that the only forum in which the parties continued to meet was in the structures of the Peace Accord, and that it was from this base that the multi-party negotiating process which eventually delivered the interim constitution was launched. The occurrence of violence in the aftermath of the assassination of Chris Hani was also surprisingly low, considering the mood of the people at that time.

The activities of the peace structures at the local level have often become the main focal point of communities. It is the only forum available to communities within which a vast range of civic, developmental and political problems can be resolved. In this regard, the local peace committee can be thought of as a sort of universal "second track".

The National Peace Accord (NPA) and its structures succeeded because they accomplished the following:

- They popularized the concept of negotiation and institutionalized it where it counted - at the grassroots level.
- It made resources available, again at the grassroots level, where they were in shortest supply and most urgently needed.
- Ordinary people were equipped with conflict resolution skills.
- Problem-solving forums were provided. These were task-oriented and not mere "talk shops".
- The structures were not imposed from the top down but were negotiated at local levels in all cases.
- Relationships were built up over time between erstwhile enemies at the level of grassroots leadership, which consistently provided a conflict management resource.

- As a national organization, the peace secretariat provided a network of communications through which learning could be transferred from one context to another throughout the country.
- The extremely wide range of organizations active in the peace structures was a considerable source of strength. Not only were almost all the political parties represented on their structures, but so were the police, and non-governmental organisations. International observers also regularly attended the meetings of local and regional peace committees as their chief means of remaining abreast of political developments in the country (Tessendorf, 1994).
- A culture of peace began to develop, and to replace the culture of violence that had dominated until then. Peace songs, T-shirts, badges, the celebration of peace days, art competitions and peace work, such as conflict intervention and monitoring, provided an alternative identity definition for many among the alienated population.

Community conflict in post-election South Africa

Since the manifestations of community conflict assumed their most alarming proportions during the late eighties and early nineties, it was assumed by politicians as well as scholar practitioners in conflict resolution, that these manifestations were the result of the death-throes of apartheid, and that as such they would fade and disappear after the advent of democracy. Although this view contains some strands of truth, it is over-simplistic regarding social processes and optimistic regarding the capacity of the new, democratic state. It simultaneously fails to take cognizance of the results of decades of apartheid, the complexities of the conflict that existed, as well as the enormity of the tasks facing the democratic government. It is in this context that the demise of the peace accord and its structures should be seen.

While unambiguously supporting the democratic transformation (which includes many sound principles of conflict resolution, including community empowerment, accountability and participation), this author points out that democracy also brings with it the strains of regular political competition, as well as the heightened expectations of a population unfamiliar with the constraints that even a democratically elected government faces.

It is therefore important to realize that apartheid cannot simply be switched off. All transitions to democracy are messy affairs and South Africa is unlikely to be an exception. The sheer numbers of the formerly excluded population will render their accommodation within the new state particularly difficult. Other serious difficulties beset the new order in South Africa. Ministries and local governments are staffed by former enemies. The power relationships among them remain largely unresolved. Eighteen months after the election, many government structures have yet to be established, and policies await implementation. During the pre-election phase, many political analysts spoke of the democracy dividend, the savings that a post-apartheid government would be able to mobilize to rebuild the country. The truth is that the democracy dividend has largely been lost. The disaffection continues to grow as government struggles to deliver. Many of the important conflicts have been shelved rather than resolved. Animosities between important parties have not yet been set aside and the death toll in KwaZulu-Natal approaches pre-election proportions.

While killings of policemen around the country can be put down to rampant crime, this in itself is a manifestation of an unresolved legitimacy crisis. Communities still see the police as "the enemy". Traumatized communities still remain, and until their underlying conflicts are addressed, the manifestations will continue, albeit in different forms. There are no second-track structures available to assist when conflict gets out of hand. There is no sustained network of intervention continually available for communities as they need it.

Conclusion

South Africa is an example of deep-rooted or Protracted Social Conflict. This point has been made repeatedly by numerous highly respected scholars within the emerging field of conflict science. Another point made by so many of these scholars is that, as in so many other societies beset by Protracted Social Conflict (and here they include Northern Ireland, Cyprus, Sri Lanka and others), conflict is going to be extremely difficult to resolve or settle. In cases of Protracted Social Conflict, they tell us, conflict persists despite all attempts to resolve it. Such intractable conflict, to use Kriesberg's terminology (1982), is not amenable to standard conflict resolution techniques. A number of stumbling blocks impinge. Parties resist attempts to get them to the table. They will either not negotiate or otherwise negotiate in bad faith, and they do not trust third party intervention. The implication is that conflict in South Africa will be extremely difficult to resolve.

While not wishing to belittle the efforts made by the many highly skilled intervenors (which I believe have been seriously underrated in the literature) in the political settlement in South Africa, nor the sacrifices made by sensitive, and forward-looking party leadership, the above scenario has patently not been the case.

At the national leadership, most of the major political opponents in South Africa entered the negotiation process with alacrity. Despite the failure of Codesa, throughout the process there was a feeling of near-inevitability about a negotiated outcome.

When examined in the light of the theories of Protracted Social Conflict, the South African scenario leaves us with three interesting propositions:

- Either theorists have it wrong, and deep-rooted social conflict is simpler to resolve than the literature suggests, or
- the theorists have it wrong, and South Africa is not an example of deep-rooted social conflict, or
- the theorists have it right and South Africa is an example of Protracted Social Conflict, and Protracted Social Conflict is intractable, which means that, as with the other examples of PSC, political settlements are plentiful, but their durability is almost in inverse proportion to their number.

It is this author's contention that the third proposition most accurately describes the position. We have witnessed a most impressive political settlement in South Africa but, as indicated earlier, we have not seen a resolution of many of the most important aspects of South Africa's deep-rooted conflicts.

Democratic elections and the implementation of the structures of liberal democracy are a necessary step in the process of conflict resolution in the country, but they are hardly sufficient. It is vital that South Africa, having developed the base for a conflict resolution field, does not lose the momentum. It is this author's contention that the scholar-practitioners in South Africa have much to teach the rest of the world, especially in respect of conflict management systems design and implementation and the institutionalizing of conflict intervention of all sorts. It would therefore not simply be a loss to this country if this expertise were lost to institutions abroad, or channelled into new directions (for instance in the service of the corporate sector, and away from communities), but it would also be a loss to the rest of the world. It is important that

- government and community organizations, as the prime potential consumers of conflict resolution, continue to recognize the usefulness of the field and nurture and sustain it, as a valuable resource to the country's Reconstruction and Development Programme;
- funders, internal and foreign, continue to support conflict resolution in communities. The education and development projects that they fund are likely to suffer as a result of poorly managed conflict;
- scholars and practitioners co-operate to reflect upon and record the important learnings made from intervention in community conflict to continue to develop the field;
- scholars and practitioners alike use their organizational bases to educate the new government and the South African public on the importance of the conflict resolution enterprise in this country.

It is not enough that conflict resolution is used as an adjunct, that it is regarded as a last resort or some form of crisis management. It is a vital second track, which should always be available for facilitating first-track developments at a vital stage in South Africa's history.

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7

VIOLENCE AND CONFLICT

JABULANI MABASU *

Conflict is an integral part of any relationship in society. It is the result of differences in needs, values and motives. Sometimes, through these differences we complement each other, and at other times we engage in conflict. Conflict is not a problem in itself. It is what we do with it that counts, or how we harness it to yield positive results. The trend in our society is that if you cannot join us, we will shoot you, and that is violent behaviour. What this means is that violence is a manifestation of conflict or action considered appropriate to break an impasse. It is important that we find other ways to break impasses, because if we fail, the possibilities of violence are great.

This paper focuses on ways to deal with conflict before it breaks out into violent action. Violence has become a daily experience in many South African communities. Conflicts, however, do not come in neat packages with their causes and component parts labelled, so that intervention parties know how to respond creatively to them. The causes are often obscured and clouded by the dynamics of the interaction. Most conflicts have multiple causes, and it is usually a combination of problems in the relations of disputants that leads to a dispute.

As mentioned earlier, the purpose of this contribution is to learn about effective conflict management strategies. But before this can be achieved, we need to understand how conflict develops.

It is necessary to go beyond the understanding of how conflict develops to identify the possible causes of a particular conflict situation or the best possible intervention or mechanism that one could apply.

The following discussion focuses on:

- Why people choose violent action in dealing with their conflicts;
- What existing approaches can be utilized by disputants other than violence;
- Considerations when choosing a process or approach.

Violence

South Africa is infamous as being one of the most violent societies in the world. A conservative estimate suggests that over 3 000 people died in political violence throughout the country in 1990 alone. Having said that, it is important to analyse South African violence

* Jabulani Mabasu, Regional Co-ordinator: Community Conflict Resolution Service (CCRS), a project of Independent Mediation Service of SA (IMSSA), Durban.

holistically, that is, the root causes of violence have to be taken into account, as well as specific incidents themselves. Not to do so is to deny our own history; to assume that all South Africans have had equal access to political and civic channels for voicing their socio-economic and political views, and have simply chosen violence to get what they want.

South Africa is intensely violent for one reason: apartheid. It is important to approach violence from this understanding rather than simply thinking that South Africans are crazy people. The challenge facing South Africans now is to deal with violence practically rather than saying that someone else will have to do "x" to stop violence.

Importance of peace

The Government of National Unity (GNU) has come up with the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). The RDP is a socio-economic framework to guide South Africa through nation and peace building.

Peace is essential for any sustained human endeavour which aims to improve quality of life. Societies embroiled in conflict do not have as priorities the sustainability of their own actions. Rather, they are primarily concerned with physical survival and safety. In KwaZulu-Natal, for example, there is no talk about development. The entire province is focused on peace and security.

Without peaceful communities, any attempt to raise the issues of development or of RDP projects is doomed to failure. A first step in conflict-ridden areas therefore is the attainment of a negotiated and enduring peace. Obviously for this peace to be sustained, it will need to be coupled with delivery on measurable development promises made by the government.

Without the prompt delivery on such development promises, fragile peace agreements cannot hope to endure in a society historically structured on personal and political intolerance, contending claims to control, leadership and power, and on the use of violence to achieve personal or political power, control and monopolization of resources.

Processes to achieve a negotiated and enduring peace

The discussion now focuses on the Independent Mediation Service of South Africa (IMMSA), and what services it offers to contribute to this peaceful society needed in South Africa.

IMSSA was formed to fill a void in the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) sphere. In the last decade, it has proved to be an effective role player in resolving industrial and community disputes and educating communities in innovative ways of managing conflict.

IMSSA thinks that South Africa needs organizations that can help strengthen the country's fledgling democracy achieved on April 27, 1994.

IMSSAs consensus-based conflict resolution processes

IMSSA panel members and staff use various consensus-based conflict resolution processes.

Joint problem solving is an interactive process involving two or more parties who seek to reach agreement over problems between them by identifying the causes of their differences, generating alternative solutions to their differences and jointly agreeing on viable solutions.

Negotiation is an interactive process involving two or more parties that seek to reach an agreement over a problem or conflict of interest between them by adjusting their views and positions while as far as possible preserving their interests in a joint effort to achieve consensus.

Mediation is a voluntary process in which the services of an independent and acceptable third party are used in a dispute to help the disputing parties arrive at an agreed solution. Mediation facilitates joint problem solving and negotiation.

Relationship-building initiative (RBI) is a consensus-building process designed by IMSSA in consultation with the parties to address the relationship needs of the parties. These needs are identified in a pre-RBI relationship needs analysis. An RBI takes place over any agreed period of time and is facilitated by experienced IMSSA mediators. An RBI is not a relationship by objectives process (RBO).

Relationship by objectives (RBO) is a four to five-day consensus-building process designed to assist parties with a damaged relationship, review their relationship and agree on objectives and action plans to restore the relationship. The RBO is facilitated by experienced IMSSA mediators. An RBO can be an RBI.

Med-Arb is a process which, by combining mediation and arbitration, gives the parties an opportunity to mediate and, failing settlement, to have the dispute arbitrated by the same third party.

Arb-Med is a process which, by combining arbitration and mediation, gives the parties an opportunity to arbitrate and then mediate the same dispute. Failing settlement in mediation, the parties revert to the decision of the arbitrator.

Some considerations when choosing a process

The following should be considered:

- The power relations between the parties,
- the levels of trust between the parties,
- the value placed by the parties on their future relationship,
- the extent to which a creative solution is possible or desirable,
- the need for the parties to co-operate in implementing or complying with a solution,
- the parties' desire to be listened to, to participate actively in the process, and to retain control over the outcome,
- the need for finality,
- the desirability of establishing a principle to govern the resolution of future disputes and the parties' preferences for an objective standard of what is a fair result versus their own notion of fairness, and
- the transaction costs of the processes.

Discussion

Conflict situations in KwaZulu-Natal make it clear that conflict resolution is a foreign concept to many communities. The historical aspects of conflict are very important and should not be ignored. Mediation and facilitation are not always appropriate or the right solution for some communities. Some communities feel perfectly comfortable when their local chief or *induna* sits down with them and advises them on ways of handling conflict. They feel that they can respect the advice of the chief or *induna*. On the other hand, academics have the perception that everyone should gather around a table to discuss the issues in an attempt to resolve the conflict. The challenge for researchers is to develop ways in which to take communities in deep rural areas into consideration, for example, in KwaZulu-Natal, when they require mediation. It is necessary to market mediation to communities in order to empower them with skills in handling conflict. Because of the interactive nature of violence and conflict it is necessary to focus on the influence of culture and security and power and how this impacts on a community such as KwaZulu-Natal - one of the most conflict ridden areas in South Africa.

Culture and security

As South Africans we have our own ways of dealing with conflict. It is therefore important to remember that a meeting of cultures is taking place. Some indigenous methods of dealing with conflict exist even if we do not use them to solve conflict in certain areas. The recognition that there is an indigenous method of resolving conflict is very important.

After the local government elections in November 1995 one can expect that a shift will take place in the alliances of people. There will also be new outsider bureaucrats because of new components in society, for example ANC members becoming part of the local governments.

Researchers need to learn from the ways disputes are resolved in deep rural areas. Unless they understand the ways in which people handle conflict they cannot relate to them. A focus on the different cultures will assist researchers to determine whether people of various cultures will resort to violence as a result of their cultural heritage.

Power

Power is in many cases the driving force behind the lack of co-operation between people. Questions of the usefulness of mediation to communities also contribute to conflict. The degree of acceptance of mediation therefore depends on power structures within the communities. In some situations people are pushed out of their communities because of their role of power in a minority group, while mediation as a tool makes them more powerful. Although mediation can be seen as a tool to empower communities, gathering around a table for negotiations is often perceived by community leaders as breaking down traditional power structures within the communities. The people need to determine whether they will resort to violence because of the impact of power or whether they will use it as a positive building mechanism for their community.

Violence

Violence is perceived as conflict that has reached an unmanageable stage as well as a method people use in pursuing their goals. Violence can even occur and be successful in its goal when

one person is not aware of conflict. This type of violence can be analysed as part of a cultural framework.

In extreme cases of violence neighbourhoods are unified by forming vigilante groups as an acceptable way of obtaining cohesion among citizens. Weapons and vigilante groups indicate that people are dissatisfied and insecure. As a result of this it has become part of some South African community cultures to walk around with guns, although people still have negative feelings when seeing armed people who cause violence. These negative feelings are an indication that people do not perceive this as being normal. People also feel that if these armed individuals are not controlled they will eventually control the majority of South Africans and even South African communities that are not as violent as statistics portray them. Naturally most South Africans prefer peace.

Violence in one situation is not the same as in another situation. It is frequently seen as a way of handling conflict. It is therefore impossible to label violence and only perceive it as an extreme form of conflict. It forms part of day-to-day conflict.

South Africa cannot be described as having a culture of violence because this implies violence as normative and this is not the case. In some areas violence is even perceived as purposeful and not irrational or spontaneous. This is however not the case in KwaZulu-Natal.

Violence and conflict in KwaZulu-Natal

Why is there more violence in KwaZulu-Natal than elsewhere in South Africa. The rest of South Africa prefers political settlements but in KwaZulu-Natal there is no sense of political agreement between parties. This in itself is a source of manipulation by political parties. The Self-defence Units (SDUs) and Self-protection Units (SPUs) are increasingly involved in conflict situations and KwaZulu-Natal in particular is full of complex interactions of conflict.

Different perceptions of people regarding violence have a negative influence on the management thereof. The perception exists that Zulu culture and history are violent and have been mythologized for political purposes. We cannot however generalize and focus on one culture only. Support for the Zulu kingdom is currently one of the factors contributing to violence and must not always be seen as people taking pride in their kingdom. One needs to distinguish between belonging to the nation versus support for the kingdom.

Crime needs an insecure community to operate in and to sustain itself. Poverty and the structure of communities can contribute to this insecurity.

Another contributing factor to the situation in KwaZulu-Natal is the subculture of violence which was inherited from previous generations and the control it has on our living time. It is important to distinguish between the root causes of conflict and violence and not just to focus on the political process that becomes the formalized external conflict.

Currently, people are not prepared to deal with the violence and it is seen by many individuals and groups as a legitimate way of dealing with conflict. It is often difficult to distinguish the root causes of violence. Formal structures like the police, the military and political parties form part of a structure that feeds the process of violence. Strong mobilization also exists among non-statutory armed formations and needs to be researched.

In some communities when strangers enter a restricted area residents immediately identify the political party to which the visitors belong. Factors such as strong political allegiance and language are critical issues being taken into consideration. In KwaZulu-Natal most people speak Zulu and the structuring of language needs a lot of attention and research as it does not contain the words necessary to deal with peace. All these factors, including ethnicity, interact with one another. Factors have not been identified that can help resolve these issues.

Violence in different areas will not always be the same for various cases. In some cases language can be more important as a contributing factor to violence and in other situations ethnicity may be the main contributing factor. In other cases more than one factor may be involved.

Conclusion

People often live in complex circumstances and are surrounded by chaos. Crisis management and survival take up so much energy that the people do not have the time to see the need for training in skills to manage conflict constructively. A lot of people question the need for these skills.

The mechanisms that people have developed over time to cope with conflict exacerbate polarization. No-go zones (areas controlled by one group where no members of other groups may go) is an example of this. These no-go zones serve as safety nets for people. They know they can sleep in peace and that if somebody from another area trespasses they will immediately be identified. No-go zones are important as arms are still smuggled in from Mozambique and SDUs are still trained in what used to be the homelands.

Political leaders exploit poverty as a mechanism of power over the people and they are not interested in development. The mind-set of the youth has not changed and co-mediation is a disaster. Impartiality is not expected. These areas of political power, the youth and co-mediation are in dire need of research and education.

8

A NEW APPROACH TO NATIONAL AND REGIONAL SECURITY

LAURIE NATHAN *

All armed forces and defence policies are constructed around a set of philosophical assumptions about such critical issues as state sovereignty, international relations and the use of military force. Most importantly, the assumptions have to do with the concept of security. What is security? What constitutes a threat to security? Whose security is at issue? By what means should security be ensured? The way in which these questions are answered at a theoretical level has a major bearing on actual policies and strategies.

This contribution begins with a critique of security policy under apartheid and the conventional approach to security applied elsewhere in the world, highlighting the preoccupation with the security of the state and the military aspects of security. It then explores an alternative model that emphasizes the security of people and the non-military dimensions of security. It concludes by considering methods of analysing threats to security.

There are two fundamental reasons for this shift in emphasis. First, the security of states is not necessarily synonymous with the security of people; in much of the world the dominant threat to citizens is their own government (Booth, 1994:3-5). Second, non-military problems like poverty, oppression and environmental degradation present grave threats to the security of people. These problems can also give rise to violent conflict and threaten the security of the state.

Because the conventional approach revolves around protecting the state, it is bound to preserve the status quo. In contrast, the alternative model conceives of security in terms of social and political transformation. By focusing on addressing injustice, economic deprivation and ecological crises, it creates an agenda for radical change (Booth, 1994:3).

Security under apartheid

The partisan nature of apartheid security policy is well known and requires little elaboration. Although the policy purported to be in the national interest, its primary goal was to maintain the system of minority rule and safeguard the racially exclusive state and the white community. Security strategy was formulated by a select group of cabinet ministers and security officials, excluding parliament and the public from effective participation.

The strategy was essentially repressive in character and was carried out principally through military and paramilitary means. The political and economic reforms of "total strategy" in the

* Prof. Laurie Nathan, Executive Director: Centre for Conflict Resolution, Rondebosch.

early 1980s and the socio-economic black upliftment programmes of the National Security Management System in the mid-1980s did not dilute this emphasis but rather broadened the concept of counter-revolutionary warfare (Swilling & Phillips, 1989: 134-148).

While the liberation movements internal anti-apartheid groups were perceived as the immediate threats to security, the targets of state repression included large sections of the civilian population in South Africa, Namibia and Angola. Pretoria's regional strategy was predicated on, and exacerbated, antagonistic relations with most neighbouring countries (Hanlon, 1986).

The net results of Pretoria's security policy were devastating: the deaths of thousands of people; the impoverishment of millions of lives; massive economic waste and damage; a regional arms race; and a greater resolve by the liberation movements and international community to end apartheid. In short, the outcome was perpetual insecurity for the states and inhabitants of South and southern Africa.

If the post-settlement government adopts a conventional model of security, it will not succeed in overcoming this legacy completely. It may seek to protect the majority of its citizens and improve relations with neighbouring states, but its understanding of "security" and the resultant strategies may remain highly militarized. This note of caution is sounded because the conventional model shares many of the features of apartheid security policy. It can therefore be subjected to a similar critique at a more general level of analysis.

Conventional approach to security

The conventional approach to security was shaped by the political conditions of the Cold War. For close on four decades the international system was characterized by acute tension between rival ideological blocs and the prospect of another major war in Europe. There was also the terrifying possibility of nuclear war. In this context, the debate around security focused on states and military stability (Booth, 1994: 3).

As a result, "security" has virtually the same meaning as "defence". Security policy is chiefly concerned with defending the sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of the state. The predominant response to perceived challenges is the threat or use of force. Fuelled by the self-serving interests of military establishments, the perpetual tendency is to build larger armies and arsenals in anticipation of worst case scenarios.

This approach has a number of major shortcomings: it generally ignores the underlying reasons for conflict; it fails to take adequate account of the security of people and the many non-military threats to their security; it contributes to a militarist ethos in civil society; it diverts resources from more productive ends; and it frequently fails to make use of the various non-violent forms of conflict resolution.

The approach can also be counter-productive, giving rise to what is termed the security dilemma: the military steps taken by a state to enhance its security can induce insecurity in other states, particularly those with which it has adversarial relations. The inevitable reaction of those states is to strengthen their own military capacity. As the arms race escalates, war preparations become more likely to provoke than prevent hostilities (Buzan, 1991).

In many parts of the Third World the concept of national security is distorted by states which lack internal legitimacy in order to justify the suppression of their citizens and advance the interests of elite groups. In reality, state security amounts to little more than regime security. The principal source of people's insecurity is their own government rather than foreign aggression (Thomas, 1991: 267-274).

Large-scale internal repression requires substantial sums to be spent on defence at the expense of socio-economic development and the provision of welfare services. The resulting impact on standards of living further reduces the security of citizens and, in some instances, intensifies popular resistance against the state.

A new model of security for Africa

For several decades United Nations (UN) agencies, independent commissions and peace studies, scholars have expressed dissatisfaction with the traditional approach to security and have sought to construct alternative theories and strategies. Since the end of the Cold War many of their ideas have been adopted by the mainstream academic discipline of strategic studies (Chipman, 1992: 109-131), as well as by senior defence officials (Worner, 1991:751) and government leaders.

A good example of government support, at least at the level of discourse, can be found in the proposal to establish a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA) (Nathan, 1992). The proposal, drawn up by African leaders in May 1991 under the auspices of the Africa Leadership Forum, is described below in order to illustrate the new approach to security in a geographic environment that includes South Africa.

The CSSDCA initiative is modelled on the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). The CSSDCA would have the following objectives: to address in a systematic way the social and economic disintegration of Africa; to regulate inter- and intra-state relations; to create mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of conflict; to promote respect for democracy and human rights; and to arrest the continent's growing marginalization in the world economy. To this end, the proposal contains a set of principles and policy measures grouped in four calabashes: security, stability, development and co-operation.

The security calabash revolves around the argument that national and regional security should not be restricted to military matters but should also include political, economic, social and environmental factors. Underdevelopment, the lack of self-sufficiency in food and energy, the abuse of human rights and a host of other critical problems are regarded as grave threats to the security of people. These problems also threaten the security of states since they invariably lead to conflict between governments and citizens.

Security is consequently defined as an all-encompassing concept that enables the individual citizen to live in peace and harmony; to have equal access to resources and the basic necessities of life; to participate fully and freely in the process of governance; and to enjoy the protection of fundamental rights.

This broad definition is a significant departure from the "state-centric" concept of security in Africa. The CSSDCA proposal distinguishes between the security of people and the security of states. The former is understood to derive from the satisfaction of social, cultural, economic,

political and human rights needs. The security of states will only be assured when these needs are met.

The CSSDCA model also motivates the adoption of a common security approach since most of the problems experienced by individual African countries are shared problems. Furthermore, instability in one state inevitably reduces the stability of neighbouring states. This requires collective responsibility and action in the security field.

Although the CSSDCA proposal deals separately with the four calabashes of security, stability, development and co-operation, it insists throughout that these goals are inextricably linked. More specifically, it argues that a sound national economy is the only durable basis for security and political stability, and that democracy is in turn a prerequisite for economic development.

Features of new thinking on security

At first glance, new thinking on security may appear to be analogous to South Africa's security doctrine of "total strategy" which similarly emphasized the political, social and economic dimensions of security (Swilling & Phillips, 1989: 134-148). The two approaches are in fact fundamentally different. Broadly speaking, the latter sought to militarize all aspects of national policy while the former seeks to demilitarize the notion of security.

One of the main criticisms of new thinking on security is that it creates so broad a security agenda as to be unmanageable. Yet the political process is precisely about making choices between competing demands. Security concerns have to be prioritised no matter how large or small the agenda. Moreover, security is not the sole responsibility of any one government department. Different dimensions are handled by the ministries of defence, foreign affairs, home affairs and development (Booth, 1994:6-7).

At the same time, the strength of new thinking on security is that it sets a broad agenda. Defining problems like poverty, environmental decay and abuse of human rights as security issues raises their political profile. There may be times when military considerations are paramount but at other times they need to be balanced against non-military threats (Booth, 1994:6-7).

Finding the right balance has important financial consequences. Economists often describe the concept of opportunity cost in terms of "guns versus butter". In other words, money that is allocated to defence could otherwise be used to meet social welfare needs. Excessive military expenditure can undermine rather than enhance the security of citizens.

The application and implications of the new model of security will naturally differ from country to country. The following sections apply the model to an analysis of the internal and external threats to South Africa.

Future threats

Over the past two decades Pretoria's security doctrine was based on the notion of a communist-inspired "total onslaught". Whatever the historic validity of this position, it is no longer appropriate in the light of the political developments that have taken place at international, regional and domestic levels since 1989. The South African National Defence

Force (SANDF) now argues that a threat-independent approach to strategic planning is the most prudent course of action considering the uncertainties and wide range of possible contingencies for armed conflict (Meiring, 1994:3).

It is apparent in the discussion below that threat scenarios are an essential tool in shaping security policy and the features of a defence force. In short, it matters a great deal whether the threats facing a country are major or minor, internal or external and military or non-military. It obviously matters too whether military threats are seaborne or land-based and conventional or guerrilla in character.

The following sections consider some theoretical and policy aspects of threat analysis, identify the likely external and internal threats to South Africa, and explore the main implications of these threats. Four arguments are presented: there is no prospect of foreign aggression; South Africa is over-armed in relation to neighbouring states; underdevelopment constitutes a significant source of domestic and regional instability; and there is consequently both the need and the potential to reallocate financial resources from defence to social and economic programmes.

The nature of threat analysis

Threat scenarios are a critical component of defence planning and the development of national strategy. They identify and analyse actual and potential threats to national security in the context of a country's vulnerabilities. As such, they provide a basis for the state to anticipate and therefore prevent or defend itself against these threats (Hough & Van der Merwe, 1988:45-46).

Governments invariably present the threat scenarios that underpin their security policy as entirely rational and objective. In reality, the scenarios are imprecise and subject to a range of methodological problems. In particular, they are inherently subjective because they rely on perceptions of threats. Actual threats may not be perceived and the threats that dominate perception may not have much substantive reality (Buzan, 1991:114-115).

The determination of threats is especially inexact when it attempts to predict long-range future events and when it seeks to discern the intentions, as distinct from the capabilities, of hostile or potentially hostile forces. Even the purportedly objective exercise of assessing an adversary's military capacity can be contested, as was evident in the debate around the strength of the Soviet armed forces during the Cold War (Unterseher, 1990:69-75).

Another difficulty arises from the fact that states are at all times confronted by a multitude of political, economic, military and ecological pressures in a competitive international environment. Identifying which of these pressures deserve to be classified as national security issues is ultimately a matter of political choice rather than objective fact (Buzan, 1991).

Part of the dilemma is that the classification of a particular threat as a national security concern depends on an evaluation of the severity of that threat:

> The main factors affecting the intensity of a threat are the specificity of its identity, its nearness in space and time, the probability of its occurring, the weight of its consequences and whether or not perceptions of the threat are amplified by historical circumstances. ...The problem, of course, is that not all of these variables can be measured, or even estimated, accurately, and that they frequently occur in complex

mixtures which make overall weighting on the spectrum of intensity a highly problematic exercise (Buzan. 1991:134).

To complicate matters further, there is the challenge of establishing the cause of a specific threat to ensure that the response of the state is appropriate and does not exacerbate the situation. Finally, as noted earlier, the concept of security is subject to various interpretations. This obviously has implications for the manner in which threats to security are perceived.

In the light of these methodological problems, the formulation of a threat scenario needs to be understood as a complex and uncertain endeavour. Far from being objective, it necessarily reflects ideological perspectives. Nevertheless, threat analyses have to be undertaken and the choice that a state makes in selecting threats will have far-reaching political consequences.

Selecting threats

National security planners, charged with ensuring the safety of a country and its inhabitants, typically fear that too narrow a selection of threats can lead to a failure to anticipate major attacks. They tend accordingly to prepare for worst case scenarios. This tendency is reinforced and often distorted by vested interests since the defence establishment and the intelligence community depend on compelling threat perceptions for their status and share of the national budget.

On the other hand, too broad a selection of threats can lead to paranoia, a waste of resources and aggressive external policies (Buzan, 1991:115). It can also result in serious disruptions of domestic politics. Defining a problem as a national security issue automatically legitimizes the use of exceptional means to respond to that problem. Excessive resort to "national security" as the justification for state action is invariably accompanied by a shift from constitutional to authoritarian forms of governance (Buzan, 1991:115-116).

This phenomenon was patently evident in South Africa in the 1980s when Pretoria portrayed the challenge to minority rule as nothing less than a "total onslaught" orchestrated by the Soviet Union. This laid the basis for a host of repressive measures: the curtailment of citizens' rights; the conferring of extraordinary powers on the security forces; the use of military force against the civilian population; the destabilization of neighbouring countries; and extensive censorship in the area of security and defence (Cock & Nathan, 1989).

The following five policy measures would help to achieve a balance between too broad and too narrow a selection of threats.

- A clear distinction should be drawn between identifying and analysing threats on the one hand, and formulating policy on security and defence on the other. The former is the task of the intelligence agencies and the latter is the responsibility of the cabinet and relevant ministers.
- Official threat assessments and the intelligence community as a whole should be subject to parliamentary scrutiny and review.
- This will require a meaningful level of transparency in security matters. While some degree of secrecy will be necessary, the emphasis should be on freedom of information rather than protection of information.

- Threat scenarios and security policy should be demilitarized in the sense of developing a preference for non-military solutions to conflict and a concern for the non-military threats to the security of people.

- Threat scenarios should motivate clearly the probability and the likely implications of particular threats occurring.

Defence analysts in South Africa and elsewhere ignore the question of probability when they oppose disarmament in the post-Cold War period on the grounds that "the future is uncertain" and "the world remains a dangerous place". These claims may be broadly correct but they are too imprecise to be of value in shaping security policy and institutions. The following discussion considers more carefully the likely internal and external threats to the post-settlement South Africa, and suggests that disarmament is both necessary and possible.

The domestic context

It is very difficult at this stage of the transition in South Africa to make confident predictions about the level of conflict and violence in the medium and long term. The experience of Namibia, Zimbabwe and Angola indicates how widely divergent the outcome of such transitions can be, ranging from relative peace to outright civil war.

Nevertheless, three broadly-defined conflict scenarios for the new South Africa can be plotted along a continuum. At one end of the spectrum is the Namibian option. In this best-case scenario, the advent of democracy ushers in a period of stability with a low incidence of violence. There is general acceptance of the election results and confidence in the political process. Political stability stimulates local and international investment, leading to a gradual economic recovery.

At the other end of the spectrum is the Angolan option. In this worst-case scenario, certain actors reject the settlement and seek to destabilize the new government through organized violence. Such actors may include hard-core elements within the Inkatha Freedom Party, right-wing groups, militant black organizations, the security forces and the homeland administrations. The white right probably constitutes the most serious threat in this regard.

In the middle option the negotiated settlement and election results are broadly acceptable to political parties and their constituencies. However, socio-economic conditions in black communities continue to give rise to violence and the state remains unable to provide effective governance and institutional means of conflict resolution. The ongoing strife creates a vicious circle, imposing severe constraints on economic growth and therefore on the government's ability to meet popular expectations for improved living standards (Oden & Ohlson, 1993).

Each of these three scenarios has different implications for the armed forces: the Namibian option enables the military to disengage from internal operations; the middle option can lead to the army performing a policing function; and the Angolan option can result in counter-insurgency measures. The latter activities are highly undesirable from both a political and a military perspective. A better approach is to build the capacity of the police to manage domestic resistance and violence on their own.

Finally, regardless of which scenario materializes, the absence of adequate social services and the high level of poverty and unemployment impacts on the security of citizens and generates some degree of violent conflict. These problems can only be addressed through development and reconstruction programmes. The new government is consequently under considerable pressure to divert financial resources from defence for this purpose.

The regional context

The political and strategic environment in Southern Africa has undergone substantial change during the past few years. Most of the major historical conflicts have been resolved or are in the process of being settled: Namibia has attained its independence; Cuban and South African troops have withdrawn from Angola; Frelimo and Renamo have concluded a cease-fire and are preparing for internationally supervised elections in Mozambique; and the end of minority rule in South Africa has removed the dominant source of regional instability.

Much of this progress is a direct consequence of the demise of the Cold War, which led to the cessation of superpower contestation on the subcontinent and a more prominent role for the UN in regional and national conflict resolution (Anglin, 1993). There has been a concomitant attenuation of ideology as a source of tension within and between Southern African countries (Adedeji, 1991:4), and this has been accompanied by significant movement towards political pluralism (Decalo, 1991:153-161).

Notwithstanding these positive developments, the current transitions to democracy are fraught with uncertainty and danger. In Angola the cease-fire agreement and subsequent elections in 1992 were thrown into turmoil when Unita rejected the election results; at the time of writing, the country remains locked in civil war. The negotiated settlements in South Africa and Mozambique are also threatened by high levels of violence.

Furthermore, Southern Africa as a whole is beset by a range of critical problems for which no immediate solutions are in sight: an absence of effective governance; authoritarian rule in some states and fragile democracies in others; internal political and ethnic conflict; chronic underdevelopment and attendant poverty, illiteracy and unemployment; large numbers of refugees and displaced people; an acute debt crisis and a net outflow of capital; and rampant disease and environmental degradation (Nathan, 1992:3-6).

These problems are exacerbated by the growing political and economic marginalization of sub-Saharan Africa. African leaders have warned that the continent is "drifting almost to the point of delinkage from the attention of the rest of the world", and has "moved from being at the periphery to the periphery of the periphery of the global economy - the permanent political underdog, the world's basket case for which there is little hope" (Nathan, 1992:5).

This summary overview of the region has two major strategic implications for South Africa. First from a political perspective there is little chance that the country will be confronted by external aggression. The historical antagonism between Pretoria and its neighbours has been replaced by co-operative political relations.

Even if this prognosis turns out to have been overly optimistic, there is no conceivable prospect of a successful attack on South Africa from a military perspective. South Africa enjoys an overwhelming military advantage in the region. It could defeat a combined assault

by the Frontline States even if it unilaterally reduced its force levels and armaments by a sizable amount. There is consequently considerable scope for disarmament.

Secondly, many Southern African countries are likely to experience ongoing instability over the next decade. This will have negative repercussions for neighbouring states. South Africa is already confronted by a number of such problems that may become more serious over time: the spread of Aids and other diseases; an influx of refugees; and cross-border trafficking in drugs and small arms. There is also the danger of domestic hostilities in contiguous states spilling over into South Africa.

It may therefore be necessary for the post-settlement defence force to patrol South Africa's borders and provide peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance at the request of its neighbours. Yet there is ultimately very little that an army can do to protect a country against Aids, refugees and related social problems. The solution to these and other critical issues lies primarily in national strategies and regional co-operation at political and economic levels.

The international context

The SANDF has expressed concern that the high level of violence in South Africa may provoke intervention by the UN along the lines of its operation in Somalia (Meiring, 1994:3). From a different perspective, some members of the ANC privately fear that the United States (US) may threaten military action if the post-apartheid government embarks on too radical a programme of social and economic transformation.

These views reflect a misreading of international politics. As a general rule, the UN only engages in peacekeeping missions with the consent of the disputing parties. This was the case in Namibia, Angola, Mozambique and Cambodia. Admittedly, there have been three exceptions in the post-Cold War period: Somalia, which was completely ungovernable and urgently required humanitarian aid; Iraq, which invaded a neighbouring state, and former Yugoslavia, where a campaign of "ethnic cleansing" was underway. None of these situations is likely to arise in South Africa. It is also doubtful that the UN will continue to undertake such operations in the future.

Direct military action by the US is extremely remote in the light of its experience in Somalia and Bosnia, the growing isolationism of the Clinton administration, the administration's positive overtures towards South Africa, and the strong support for the ANC in the US Congress. More importantly, Washington has never regarded Southern Africa as having the strategic and economic importance of Latin America and the Middle East. Since the end of the Cold War, international interest in the subcontinent has declined even further.

A more realistic concern is that the major industrial powers and financial institutions will interfere in domestic decision making in South Africa in non-military ways. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are doing this throughout Southern Africa and elsewhere in the Third World by insisting that foreign loans and aid are accompanied by prescribed political and economic reforms.

In conclusion, the absence of a conventional military threat and the high level of poverty in South Africa create the need and the potential for disarmament. Ongoing domestic violence may require the deployment of the defence force but would be better dealt with by the police.

Instability in Southern Africa should be tackled through political and economic co-operation and through a common approach to regional security.

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9

SECURITY AND PEACE

MARK SHAW *

The following areas in the field of security and peace need attention:

- The role of the state in development.
- The relationship between development and conflict.
- New threats to our security.

Should we have a narrow or a broad perspective of security? Is it important to look at the role that security and the intelligence forces play with regard to development and conflict? Do they in fact play a role and how can this role be defined?

The role of the state in development

The development of human resources is often neglected. The state focus on crime distracts our attention from other debates concerning the structure of our society. The state is pulling away from issues of security, and civil society is making security an important issue through a number of processes. This can lead to the question whether the government is still a unity. Some sections or departments want to downplay security while others want to upgrade it but only for selfish reasons.

Interesting developments are taking place at grassroots level. The police are often unable to investigate and prosecute all cases of criminality and therefore people take the law into their own hands. The privatization of policing forces in the different areas of the country is another recent development. The way we are policing our society is constantly changing and this relates to what the state is perceived to be doing and what ordinary people on the ground are doing in response to crime.

The state focuses on crime because it receives clear instructions from foreign countries to put greater emphasis on crime in order to receive funding and to make foreign investments possible. Sanctions and a withdrawal of funds will result if South Africa does not pay attention to crime and ways to deal with it effectively.

Furthermore, the root causes of conflict and violence should be addressed. Areas need to be developed and a greater emphasis placed on dealing with causes, not only symptoms of conflict. Violence is a symptom of the problem and poverty can be seen as a root cause thereof.

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* Mark Shaw, Senior researcher: Institute for Defence Policies, Johannesburg.

A possible solution might be the inflow of resources. People need resources to be mobilized. We need mechanisms that impact on all levels of society in order to curb the violence and establish economic stability. We therefore need a more holistic approach to understanding the root causes, such as poverty.

The intelligence services need progressive ways of resolving conflict. If we focus on the debate between outsiders and insiders it is usually the insiders or bureaucrats that are seen as the "bad" ones. The inevitable question will focus on who will control the intelligence services.

The potential for abuse is greater in the intelligence services when there is a greater potential for information collection. The right to collect information in a democratic society cannot be denied. The state also has a responsibility in this regard. The problem that arises is not the collection of information as such, but those groups of people that are chosen to be monitored. The debate within the intelligence community is that one can only know if you know, and "I don't know you are bad until I look at what you are doing". During this debate the ambit of the collection of information is actually expanded.

Development and conflict

Most of the conflict in South Africa takes place in communities where there is a lack of development. The people's readiness and ability to cope with change economically, educationally, etc. is also problematic and sometimes gives rise to conflict. In these circumstances development can create conflict and not stability and peace. It is therefore necessary to manage the process of development.

In his book on conflict and development, Mark Smith stresses the interaction between these two variables. Interaction between conflict and development relates to the management of the process and the RDP is an example. Before developing a community it is necessary to determine the real needs. People have to be united. Research plays a very important role in determining the needs beforehand. Although development is taking place in many areas, some groups of people are still not satisfied and violence and conflict may continue. In many cases this is the result of development which took place without consulting the community on their needs. The delivery structures also play an important role. If the community doesn't perceive such structures as legitimate they will not accept development initiatives.

Research in regulatory negotiation, where parties to the conflict get together and decide on the rules to be followed during the negotiation process, proves that parties comply in 85 per cent of the cases where they get together even before they negotiate. Through this process they address all relevant issues and try to establish common ground. Researchers must, however, always ask themselves whether they are really addressing conflict and development.

New threats to our security

We are experiencing an overall decline in morality at present in South Africa and this in itself causes conflict. There is a lack of role models and this results in a lack of a new morality. The process of transformation also creates new value systems but the transformation itself does not bring about a new ethical culture.

One can also expect that new forms of conflict will develop after the local government elections in November 1995. It is to be expected that political parties may use development for propaganda purposes. Development and conflict resolution are dependent on each other. It is important to remember that when an individual acts as a developer he/she also fulfils the role of a mediator and/or facilitator.

Recommendations

- Increase research into policy making and policy studies.
- People are feeling frustrated with violence and therefore they form Self-defence Units. Research on a security arm for the RDP as a possible solution is suggested.
- Guidelines for researchers to determine the impact of violence on conflict resolution should be developed.
- Researchers should compare the implementation of research results or outcomes with the original situations. Did the research increase the understanding of the situation.
- More work should be done on development theory. The existing theory is inadequate.

Conclusion

Development is much more complex than we perceive it to be. There is no theoretical framework that caters specifically for South African needs. Some models are anti-developmental and some existing development models are unrealistic.

10

THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE IN TRANSITION: ATTITUDES, PERCEPTIONS AND VALUES OF POLICE PERSONNEL IN AN EASTERN CAPE COMMUNITY[1]

ROB MIDGLEY * AND GEOFF WOOD *

Because it served for many years as one of the guardians of apartheid, the South African Police Service has a mixed reputation among the country's citizens. Its image was further damaged by the rise of crime in the late 1980s, a wave that was partially a reflection of economic recession and partially the result of the police being overcommitted in curbing internal political dissent. In the early 1990s decision makers on the political front, as well as within the police, recognized the need to recast the nature of policing. The Interim Constitution now enjoins the police to develop community policing services.[2]

The service, as a truly national institution, has a central role to play in nationwide reconciliation and reconstruction. Yet it is apparent that not all police members agree with the new policing policy and initiatives - some for political reasons, others on the basis that the new strategy is bound to be ineffective.

This paper records the attitudes, perceptions and values, during the transition period, of people employed by the South African Police Service in Grahamstown. It is based upon a survey conducted during July 1994 and focuses on the new initiatives and the nature of policing generally and aims to discover to what extent staff at local level are prepared to meet the demands placed upon them.

Much of the analysis in this contribution is race and gender-based. We appreciate that the use of race in this fashion is highly problematic. However, because race was overemphasized in the past and because internal apartheid was practised within the police, such an analysis is necessary to determine views which to date have been ignored and imbalances that need to be rectified.

National Issues relevant to the survey

A number of national developments could, or should, have affected the survey results:

- Even prior to the Interim Constitution, police acknowledged the need to improve relations between themselves and the communities they served. A number of working groups were established during 1992 to investigate possible ways of achieving this goal.[3] By late 1992, a number of community-police liaison forums were established.[4]

* Rob Midgley, Professor of Law: Rhodes University.
* Geoff Wood, Lecturer, Department of Sociology: Rhodes University.

- In 1992 police hierarchy decided to address the racial imbalances which existed in its upper ranks. Bridging courses were introduced to enable suitable people to enter the police at the upper echelons, without having to work their way through the ranks.[5] Three black members were promoted to generals for the first time in police history.[6]
- Changes in the management of labour relations accompanied policy changes and the service has become increasingly unionized. Two major unions operated within the police at the time of the survey: the Police and Prison Civil Rights Unions (POPCRU), which in the past had often been at loggerheads with the police command, and which was affiliated to the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU); and South African Police Union (SAPU), which although more conservative, had adopted an increasingly militant stance.[7]
- The South African police's strategic plan for 1994 emphasized police accountability to local communities. This plan was made known and discussed within the service, including local police station staff. It was also discussed within community structures.
- In order to reflect the changed emphasis on community accountability the institution would in future be known as the South African Police Service.[8]
- It was announced that the military-style rank system would be scrapped.

Developments at local level

As was the case elsewhere in South Africa, the relationship between the police and the black community in Grahamstown was most unsatisfactory for many years. However, a number of steps were taken to deal with this problem:

- During June 1992, in line with the South African Police's strategic plan for the entire country, a community-police consultation forum was established. In September 1992, after a march by township residents to protest against inadequate policing measures, the township delegation and the police agreed to establish a "policing commission". The commission was requested to find ways of improving the relationship between the Grahamstown police and the public and to suggest better methods of policing in the city. The commission conducted workshops with members of the community and with the Grahamstown police, primarily to familiarize both parties with the concept of community policing. By August 1993 township communities participated fully in forum activities. In all, 23 forum meetings were held prior to the survey.
- In September 1993 a workshop was held to consider the implementation of a Community Visitors Programme, in terms of which accredited members of the community visited and reported on conditions in police cells. In December 1993 seven visitors were appointed and in January 1994 the visits commenced. Reports were submitted regularly to the station commander (via the duty officer), to the District Commissioner and to the forum. Thus far, the programme has had an impact on detention conditions in the police cells, particularly regarding juveniles. Among others, food and washing arrangements have improved. Cases of police assaults were also found and referred to the Reporting Officer.
- In April 1994 members of the police, the Attorney-General's office, the public, the district surgeon, lawyers and social workers attended a meeting at which new procedures were

decided upon for the investigation of rape cases.[9] All members of the police, including the Internal Stability Unit (ISU), attended sensitivity training workshops conducted by civilian social workers.

- The ISU in Grahamstown was not exempted from applying community-policing principles. Members attended the sensitivity training workshops were also deployed to perform ordinary-visible policing functions. As a result, the unit undertook foot patrols in the township.
- The existence of the consultation forum did not prevent the police from engaging in their own bilateral initiatives with particular stakeholders. For example, police made a special effort to involve youth. They conducted joint workshops with COSAS (The Congress of South African Students) and were invited to participate in career guidance and life skills programmes in township schools. The police and the ANC Youth League jointly organized a cultural and sports day on 16 June 1994.
- In mid-1993, a senior police officer was appointed at district level to promote community-policing initiatives in the area. At the time of the survey in July 1994 the Community Relations Division had three members of staff at district level although no Community Police Officers had been appointed at station level. The Community Relations Division was mostly responsible for arranging police involvement in the activities outlined above.

Research method

As noted earlier, the research was conducted during July 1994. It consisted of an opinion survey of South African Police Service personnel, including civilian staff, stationed at the Market Square Police Station in Grahamstown, and its satellite ISU station in Joza. The Market Square premises also house the district headquarters for 16 other police stations. The service employs about 350 personnel in Grahamstown. Two hundred and twenty questionnaires were distributed and 169 were returned.

The survey was conducted through probability sampling using stratified sampling. The overall population was divided up into a series of identifiable strata, defined in terms of different police ranks and units, to include encompass personnel from all the major sectors within the service. These constituted the primary sampling unit. Interviews were co-ordinated by trained interviewers, some fully conversant with the languages of the area, thus enabling respondents to answer questions in the manner in which they felt most comfortable. The stratigraphics computer programme, which performed limited statistical tests, drew cross-tabulations and generated graphs, was thereafter used to analyse the survey data.

The researchers administered the questionnaires to personnel who were on duty at specific times over a three-day period in order to accommodate shift workers. Two approaches were used: approximately half the respondents completed the questionnaires at a central venue, while those who could not be at the venue were given questionnaires to complete in their own time.[10] The procedure had inherent risks and some respondents may have been influenced by other persons.

Biographical Information

Three-quarters of the respondents were male and 78 % were between the ages of 18 and 35. Forty-nine per cent were white, 33 % black and 16 % coloured. Most respondents were Afrikaans speaking (53 %), 28 % were Xhosa speaking, while 14 % spoke English, four per cent Zulu and one per cent Sotho. Twenty-five per cent of the respondents (42 persons) were civilians employed by the police service, 13 % of whom were clerical staff, 11 % were labourers and one per cent were artisans. Of the 127 police personnel interviewed, three per cent held the rank of either major, lieutenant colonel or colonel, four per cent were either lieutenants or captains, five per cent were warrant officers, 18 % lance sergeants or sergeants, 36 % constables and eight per cent police assistants.

Eight per cent of respondents were previously members of the municipal police and six per cent were members of other police organizations. Former railway police officers constituted one per cent and another one per cent had previously served as permanent members of the South African Defence Force. Interestingly, no-one had served in the former homeland police forces or in the prison services. This situation is likely to change, however, when the former homeland police forces amalgamate with the old South African Police to form a new service.

Most of the respondents (39 %) served in the Visible Policing section (uniform branch), 20 % were ISU members, and 18 % were members of the Crime Combatting and Investigation Unit. Twenty per cent, mainly civilian respondents, indicated that they did not fall into the above categories. Most of these were clerical personnel. Of the total sample, 12 % did patrol duties, 11 % were investigating officers, 10 % served in the charge office, while four per cent, mainly police assistants, performed guard duties only. Twenty per cent performed duties that did not fall in any of the above classifications, while a further 23 % failed to answer the question.

Eleven per cent of the respondents occupied managerial positions, while a further seven per cent indicated uncertainty whether or not they could be classed as managers. Just over half the personnel were unionized: 25 % belonged to POPCRU, 24 % to SAPU and four per cent to the Public Servants Association (PSA). Forty-four per cent did not belong to unions at the time of the survey.[11]

Further analysis of respondents' duties revealed that 20 % were involved in general administration. These tasks were performed both by civilians and a significant proportion of regular police personnel. In particular, 43 % of respondents in category lieutenant to captain were involved in performing general administrative duties. Thus, despite the policy of shifting administrative tasks to civilians, including specialized categories such as personnel, a significant number of experienced police officers are occupied with administrative work. Civilian involvement appears limited to the area of support staff, for example typists.

A feature of the survey was the apparent inexperience of the respondents. Seventy per cent of the staff had less than ten years' experience. However, further analysis showed, not surprisingly, that police assistants had the least experience (with 93 % having less than five years experience), followed by constables (68 %), civilian clerical assistants (64 %) and labourers (61 %). Members in more senior ranks/occupational categories tended to have far longer experience. Generally speaking, civilian employees had much less experience than regular members of the service. Very few civilian respondents had more than 15 years'

working experience in the police (see Table 1). This could be a partial reflection of the service's recent shift in policy to employ civilians in positions that do not require specific police training. However, it is also possible that civilian occupations have less favourable conditions of service and offer less attractive career paths.

TABLE 1: Length of service (Percentage)

	1 year or less	2-5 years	6-10 years	11-15 years	16-20 years	21-25 years	26-30 years	More than 30 years
Police	25	37,5	12,5	22,5	0	2,5	0	0
Civilians	12,8	40	24	9,6	4,8	1,6	4,8	2,4

There is a definite correlation between the ranks of respondents and the division of labour on the one hand, and race and gender on the other. The service in Grahamstown remained predominantly white, especially as far as the middle and upper ranks were concerned. Blacks tended to be clustered in the lower ranks, and constituted the overwhelming majority of police assistants. The highest ranking black police members surveyed were warrant officers. This was also the case with female members. Management was primarily white and male, in both instances 94 % of the sample. Only one female respondent and one black respondent considered themselves to have some management function. The clerical staff were all white women; the artisans all white males; 72 % of the labourers were black males, the remainder being coloured males.

Results

Identity and Belonging

Most respondents (85 %) claimed that they were proud to be members of their institution, with nine per cent being unsure and two per cent indicating that they were not. Again, most (72 %) saw themselves as having a definite career path in the service, while 20 % were uncertain and five per cent clear that they would not be police members forever. Responses to a question on the representivity of the service showed similar consistency: 72 % felt that the service was representative of the people it served, 14 % were unsure and 11 % felt that the service was unrepresentative. These views are worth noting, for the facts indicate otherwise: the people of Grahamstown are not 49 % white, 75 % male, 53 % Afrikaans-speaking or 28 % Xhosa speaking, for example. Nor does the composition of management reflect society at large.*

Union affiliation

Table 2 compares rank and/or occupational status with union affiliation. Twenty-eight percent[12] of POPCRU's membership was civilian, mostly in the labourer category. The four

* See first paragraph of biographical information.

per cent civilian component of SAPU[13] and 14 % of PSA[14] belonged to the clerical staff. Thus, only POPCRU had made serious inroads among the civilian staff. POPCRU members were predominantly black (91 %), while SAPU membership consisted mainly of white (65 %) and coloured (25 %) members. POPCRU and SAPU were similar in size, but SAPU was probably more representative of the work force in Grahamstown. SAPU had made important inroads into the ranks of the junior officers and, in addition, organized over one-third of the warrant officers. In contrast, the most senior POPCRU members surveyed were warrant officers. Membership among the more senior ranks did not automatically determine membership among junior ranks, however. Closer examination revealed that the mode of constables (41 %) were SAPU members, while POPCRU accounted for 23 %. In contrast, over 64 % of police assistants were POPCRU members, compared to only seven per cent SAPU members. In other words, POPCRU had achieved the greatest degree of penetration among the most marginalized members of the service, those who did not have much status or training.[15]

Interestingly, only the PSA was represented among the more senior ranks (major and upward), but little significance should be attached to this fact. This may simply be a relic of the past where civil servants tended to become members of the PSA as a matter of course. The PSA has not engaged in modern union-type activities and as a result has not enjoyed the same rapid rate of expansion within the service as the other two unions. However, because of the senior positions occupied by some of its members it has a potential capacity to exert influence.

Although half the respondents were unionized, the overwhelming majority of respondents (70 %) believed that police unions should have no affiliation to political parties. Only a small minority (12 %) saw political alliances as desirable. Opposition to political alliances was apparent among both SAPU and POPCRU members, despite the latter's links to COSATU and, hence, the tripartite alliance. Police members seem to have a somewhat different attitude towards political unionism than workers in other sectors. There seemed to be a strong commitment to the political neutrality of the service, although neutrality in practice is of course a highly subjective construct. On the one hand, this attitude could enhance the role of the police as neutral arbiters in community disputes and as enforcers of objective standards of behaviour, while on the other it may prevent police from taking decisive action when competing demands are at issue. None the less, there is a clear organizational self-perception of independence.

TABLE 2: Rank/status and union affiliation (Percentage)

	No response	POPCRU	SAPU	PSA	No union
Civilian Clerk	0	0	4	14	82
Civilian Artisan	100	0	0	0	0
Civilian Labourer	0	61	0	0	39
Major-Colonel	0	0	0	20	80
Lieutenant - Captain	0	0	29	0	71
Warrant Officer	0	12	38	0	50
Sergeant	3	20	27	10	40
Constable	2	23	41	0	34
Police Assistant	7	65	7	0	21

Management of the organization

Only 11 % of the respondents occupied managerial positions, some of whom were members of SAPU and PSA, yet with only one manager belonging to POPCRU. One per cent of managers were female and another one per cent were black.

The relationship between management and unions is clearly an uneasy one. From its inception POPCRU and police management throughout the country have been at loggerheads over POPCRU's overtly political role, its regular use of strike action and allegations of racism. Most respondents were either uncertain, or believed there was little co-operation between management and their union (see Table 3). Similarly, few respondents believed that management saw their union as a means of effective management. Roughly the same number of respondents believed management saw unions as opposition (15 %) as those that thought this was not the case (18 %), while the mode (30 %) were unsure. This information suggests that respondents remain uncertain as to the implications of unionization, and the responses of management thereto. In other words, while the process of unionization is comparatively advanced, the bargaining process has yet to become institutionalized, or formalized to the same degree as is the case in the private sector. Interestingly, a large proportion of both SAPU and POPCRU members were uncertain of how management viewed unions, and one can conclude that if SAPU is supposed to have a "special" relationship with management, this is not evident to the rank-and-file in terms of their everyday experiences. In other words, the members of both unions see their respective organizations as operating independently of management, and as potentially capable of challenging it.

TABLE 3: Management/union relations (Percentage)

	Yes	No	Unsure	No response Not applicable
Is there co-operation between management and your union?	17	24	38	21[16]
Does management see your union as opposition?	15	18	30	37
Does management see your union as a means of effective management?	14	12	37	37
Trade unions should be represented at management meetings	44	15	31	10

As noted above, respondents generally found political affiliation of unions unacceptable and there was also a clear division of opinion on the right of unions to strike. Thirty four per cent believed there should be a right to strike, 42 % were opposed. These views had to impact on internal relations between and within the two unions. Members were divided on whether or not the unions should combine, with 39 % in favour, 28 % against and 29 % uncertain. It is therefore unlikely that a single police union will emerge in the foreseeable future. Management may well have decided to refrain from engaging unions until the dust has settled and unions have established clear roles for themselves and improved their internal communication structures.

Although half the respondents stated that union leaders were accountable to their members, it is significant that 33 % were unsure and that 10 % felt that it was not the case. The views in this regard did not split along management/union lines. While 50 % of management was undecided, 33 % felt that union leaders were accountable and 11 % felt that they were not. Thirty-two per cent of non-management respondents were undecided, 51 % perceived union leaders to be accountable and 10 % felt that they were not accountable. This information indicates that attitudes of management and communication structures within unions are sufficiently favourable for successful participatory management in future.

Table 4 sets out respondents' perceptions of the relationship between black and white police officers according to their rank or categories of employment.

TABLE 4: Interracial relationships (Percentage)

	Friendly	Comradely	Not really friendly	Anta-gonistic	No response
Civilian Clerk	59	18	18	0	5
Civilian Artisan	0	0	0	0	100
Civilian Labourer	11	6	78	5	0
Major-Colonel	20	60	0	20	0
Lieutenant-Captain	71	29	0	0	0
Warrant Officer	50	37	0	13	0
Sergeant	37	13	37	7	6
Constable	41	5	38	3	13
Police Assistant	36	0	50	0	14

In the main, junior ranks and civilian labourers perceived race relations within the service to be "not really friendly" or "antagonistic". It is at these levels where blacks within the service are most concentrated, and where informal and *ad hoc* discrimination is most likely to be practised. However, respondents in management and supervisory positions were divided as to whether relations were amicable or antagonistic. The table therefore reflects a cleavage between the base and summit within the service and indicates that leadership, while potentially accommodating, has a somewhat different perspective from those at the base.

One of the service's stated aims is to encourage participatory management and a number of questions were designed to test the views of respondents in this regard. There was no agreement as to whether junior ranks were consulted about their views. Forty per cent claimed that it was the case, 30 % not, with 22 % being unsure. Respondents' views on who should be represented at management meetings are set out in Table 5.

TABLE 5: Views on participatory management (Percentage)

	Yes	No	Unsure	No response
Lower ranking members should be represented at management meetings	76	7	9	8
Trade unions should be represented at management meetings	44	15	31	10
Since management is entirely white, a special effort should be made to include the views of black members at management meetings	66	8	17	10
A special effort should be made to include the views of female members at management meetings	73	7	12	8

Although the overall survey data to some extent indicates a hierarchical management style, Table 5 shows that respondents have a clear preference for participatory management. The table indicates either a need for interest groups to be represented at management level, or an underlying dissatisfaction that the needs of specific interest groups have not been addressed. However, it should be noted that respondents are ambivalent about the role of trade unions in management. Their preference, it appears, is for representation of specific interest groups.

Proper communication channels are essential to the effective operation of a participatory management system. Respondents were deeply divided as to whether communication channels within the service were adequate. Thirty per cent believed that this was so, 34 % disagreed, while the rest were either uncertain (25 %) or failed to answer the question (11 %). Exactly the same results were registered when respondents were asked whether management reported fully and regularly to all members. If one adds to this the doubts expressed about the accountability of union leaders, then it is clear that the communication system within the station needs to be looked at from every perspective in order to see to what extent it can be improved. In doing so, the findings set out in Table 6 are apposite.

TABLE 6: The effectiveness of feedback methods[17]

	% indicating that it is the best method	% indicating that it is the worst method
Lectures	28	23
Workshops	15	7
Seminars	3	4
Group discussions	20	10
Correspondence	13	32
Other	2	2
No response	19	22

Generally, respondents did not opt for a particular form of feedback, but appeared to have favoured some form of group interaction (workshops, seminars and group discussions) over other forms. Respondents were divided over the value of lectures, but correspondence was the least favoured form of feedback. This latter view was particularly prevalent among police assistants - a possible indication of the relatively lower education and literacy levels than in the case of other respondents.

Approaches to policing

Most respondents (60 %) believed that the service had the correct approach to policing. However, 15 % believed this was not the case, and 20 % were uncertain. There is some ambiguity in this finding. The approach was not defined in the survey and it is therefore unclear whether respondents had old-style or new-style policing in mind. However, the Grahamstown police have made a special effort over the past two years to implement the community-policing concept and one can therefore assume that most respondents had this approach in mind. Seventy-eight per cent of respondents described the service's work as providing a community service. It appears therefore that there is a substantial group that is willing to experiment with alternative policing strategies. However, it should not be assumed that those committed to the current approach are automatically hostile to any modification thereof.

Respondents' views relating to community policing constitute an important aspect of the survey, for not only do these indicate the extent to which members would be willing to accept changes within the service, but the degree to which the enthusiasm in Grahamstown towards this policy has had practical effect. Community policing initiatives depend upon the support and participation of every person employed by the service. Eighty-two per cent of the respondents indicated that they understood what community policing means, with only 12 % indicating that they did not. Seventy-five per cent thought that community policing was a good policy, 17 % were unsure with only one per cent disagreeing with the policy. What makes this finding interesting is that respondents were not convinced that the policy maintained professional standards. Thirty-four per cent felt that community policing sacrifices professionalism, 32 % were unsure and only 24 % felt that it did not. Opposition to change seems bound up with a desire to preserve professional identity.

Table 7 compares the length of service of respondents with support for the community policing policy and it is apparent that there is overwhelming support for the concept, with the only doubts expressed among those with less than ten years' service. However, closer analysis reveals that the uncertainty was mainly among civilian personnel: only 42 % fully supported community policing, as opposed to 78 % of the police members. This seems to indicate that civilians and less-experienced personnel have yet to be fully drawn into the community-police initiative in a manner that would ensure that they have a vested interest in the programme. Care should be taken not to marginalize these sectors.

Community-police forums were considered an essential part of community policing and the Grahamstown forum had been operating for about 18 months. Given this fact, respondents' levels of awareness of the forum's existence were somewhat disappointing. Forty-nine per cent were aware of it, 26 % were not, 17 % were unsure and nine per cent did not respond. Forty-

six per cent thought that the forum was a good thing and six per cent disagreed. Thirty-six per cent were uncertain and 13 % did not respond.

Eleven per cent of the respondents attended forum meetings on a regular basis and 32 % occasionally.[18] Half the respondents had never attended forum meetings. This places a question mark on whether police personnel do in fact accept the community-policing policy to the extent that they are prepared to participate actively in the transformation process. The survey revealed that forum meetings were attended primarily by senior ranks and management. Of those who attended forum meetings, 44 % were from management, while 33 % did not occupy management positions.[19] Twenty-four per cent of management had never attended meetings. It is clear, given that management constitutes only 11 % of the respondents and that senior personnel make a special effort to attend forum meetings. The same can be said for all categories of respondents barring constables and civilians. Constables made up 36 % of the sample, yet they constituted only 11 % of those who attended regularly and 39 % of those who did not attend. Similarly, civilians formed 25 % of the sample, six per cent of those who attended and 41 % of those who did not. These figures are not unexpected, however, for these categories are also likely to have the least decision-making powers.

TABLE 7: Comparison of length of service and support for community-policing policy (Percentage)

	Support	Unsure	Do not support	No response
Less than 1 year service	69	23	4	4
Between 2 and 5 years	75	22	0	3
Between 6 and 10 years	69	17	3	11
Between 11 and 15 years	91	5	0	4
Between 16 and 20 years	83	17	0	0
Between 21 and 25 years	100	0	0	0
Between 26 and 30 years	83	17	0	0
More than 30 years service	100	0	0	0

The interest in forum meetings can also be viewed from a different perspective. Of those who attended forum meetings on a regular basis, those involved in visible policing constituted the largest proportion, but attendance and non-attendance of members of this section corresponded to its portion of the sample. The crime combatting and investigation division had the best record of attendance - 18 % of the sample, 28 % of those who attended regularly and 10 % of those who did not. The ISU and members who fell outside these three sections had the worst record: each constituted 20 % of the sample, 17 % of those who attended forum meetings, and 27 % of those who never attended. However, when analysing the data according to the nature of respondents' duties, one discovers that guards, investigating officers and members who do patrols do not attend forum meetings. This is a disappointing feature, for the latter two categories should be at the forefront of community-policing initiatives.

Another interesting conclusion is that non-unionized members of the service are more likely to attend forum meetings than those members who belong to unions. Forty-four per cent of the respondents were not affiliated to unions, but this category formed 61 % of those who attended forum meetings, and 44 % of those who did not. Attendance of SAPU members corresponded to their sample portion, but POPCRU members appeared not to attend meetings: 11 % of the sample, 11 % of those who attended and 26 % of those who did not.[20]

Quality of services rendered

A feature of the replies to the more detailed questions on this topic was the large number of respondents who failed to respond. In addition, there appears to be some contradictory responses. This may be because only a small portion of the work force appears to render services directly to the public.[21]

Not surprisingly, the vast majority of respondents (78 %) described their experience of the service's work as having provided a community service, while 10 % described it as catching criminals. A small group said that their experience indicated that police work was aimed at protecting white people (two per cent) and making life difficult for black people (three per cent). On the whole respondents felt that police succeeded in protecting the community they served: 68 % said "yes" and 19 % said "partly". Only one per cent disagreed, while the rest were unsure. Professional pride or institutional loyalty may have created a false sense of achievement, however, for when asked later whether people in Grahamstown felt safe and secure, 43 % of respondents said "yes", ten per cent "no" and 35 % were unsure. Also, despite the pride in their work, many respondents seemed to believe that they did not render a totally effective service, as Table 8 indicates.

Forty-seven per cent of respondents estimated that police responded to requests for police assistance within 10 minutes and 27 % between 11 minutes and half an hour. Six per cent estimated that it took between 31 minutes and an hour, while eight per cent felt that it took longer. Respondents generally believed that these response times were adequate. Twenty-eight per cent considered response times to be immediate and a further 41 % considered them to be acceptable.

Respondents did not agree on whether the level of police patrols was sufficient. While 33 % found the level to be quite acceptable, 34 % considered it to be somewhat acceptable and 20 % unacceptable. Particular streets were patrolled on a daily basis, said 60 %, and once a week according to another 11 %. Three per cent said once a month, six per cent, hardly ever, and another six per cent, never. The most common way of moving about while on duty was in vehicles, 34 % in vans, 16 % in cars and four per cent in armoured vehicles. Sixteen per cent moved about on foot and one per cent on bicycles.

Respondents also appeared uncertain of the effect of police patrols. Eighty per cent felt that patrols prevented crime. A substantial group (60 %) thought that they provided reassurance, but the no-response rate (34 %) was quite high. Patrols seem to assist police in getting to know communities better (56 %), but not individuals (only 37 % felt that they did). Again a large percentage of respondents, 38 % and 43 % respectively, failed to offer an opinion in the latter two instances.

TABLE 8: Quality of service (Percentage)

	Yes	No	No response
The manner in which the police service is provided can be described as helpful	67	8	25
The manner in which the police service is provided can be described as sensitive	42	16	42
The manner in which the police service is provided can be described as courteous	40	11	49
Members of the police treat people fairly	69	11	20
Members of the police treat people in a non-discriminatory fashion	45	20	35
Cases are dealt with promptly	45	17	38
Cases are dealt with efficiently	51	14	35
Cases are dealt with effectively	54	12	34

Ability to adapt to change

The major challenge facing the service is that of transformation. This has to occur on a number of fronts: from an organization that upheld the system of apartheid to one which protects individual liberties; from an organization in which management consisted of white people to one that better reflects the racial composition of society; from a militaristic force to an organization that provides a social service; and from a law-and-order philosophy to one of community policing. To achieve any one of these objectives alone is difficult: to achieve all of them at the same time places extraordinary tension on the entire organization and its staff. It is therefore necessary to determine to what extent respondents are able to adapt to the transition process.

From Table 9, which compares rank with beliefs as to whether attitudes displayed by the service have changed since the elections which took place three months before the survey was conducted, it can be seen that civilian labourers most commonly believed there had been no change. In contrast, a small majority of uniformed members, in most rank categories, believed that the attitude of service had changed since the elections. This is a good sign, for it indicates that some people have been prepared to change and that such changes have been noticed. However, there is a question mark on the issue of change, for a question on levels of racism produced conflicting results. Twenty-seven per cent felt that the level of racism in the service had decreased since the elections, while 34 % felt that it had not and 25 % were unsure. These figures indicate that there is still some work to be done.

TABLE 9: Has the attitude of police changed since the elections? (Percentage)

	Yes	Unsure	No	No Response
Civilian: Clerical	23	50	27	0
Civilian: Artisan	0	100	0	0
Civilian: Labourer	17	28	55	0
Major-Colonel	80	0	20	0
Lieutenant-Captain	43	28	29	0
Warrant Officer	75	0	25	0
Sergeant	57	13	27	3
Constable	53	26	13	8
Police Assistant	57	14	22	7

Attention may also have to be given to the relationship between police members and civilian personnel, however. Given the high degree of pride that police members have in the service, it is probable that civilian staff have not been afforded the recognition they deserve, either for being part of the organization or for the nature and quality of the work. As a result it is natural that those at the periphery, who are not full members of the service, are more likely to be critical of the organization's ability to adjust to changes.

When asked whether the structure and make-up of the service should change, 47 % of respondents felt this was unnecessary, while 39 % thought that it was desirable and 14 % did not respond. This reluctance to endorse structural change is not surprising in a period of transition. A prerequisite for change is the realization that change is necessary. Where members of an institution feel that it operates satisfactorily, one is likely to find some resistance to suggestions for either a change in structure or a change in work procedures. The figures do indicate, however, that there is a substantial group within the service that could potentially subvert or retard transformation initiatives.

Not only did respondents feel that their institution was representative of society, but they also seemed reasonably comfortable with the traditional militaristic image of the police, although there was some division as to whether structural and symbolic changes should be made or whether the status quo should be retained. Sixty-seven per cent felt that uniforms should stay the same and 73 % that police should carry firearms. Twenty-three per cent felt that a different style of uniform should be worn. Only three per cent were opposed to uniforms and eight per cent to the carrying of firearms. Respondents were more divided on the proposed changes in the system of rank. Thirty-one per cent felt that it was a good idea, 30 % disagreed and 28 % were indifferent.

Again, the results indicate that a move away from the current militaristic nature of the service is likely to be met with some resistance. Features of a new-style service include a change in policy regarding uniforms, replacing authoritarian management with participatory management and community involvement in decision making. The pride that members have in the current set-up was noted above and there is clearly a large group of members who believe that the old centralized structures of command should be retained. It is evident that a sizable group of respondents see the demilitarization of the police as a direct attack on the perceived professional identity of the service.

Although there appears to be some acceptance of regional decentralization, respondents seem to be reluctant to accept grassroots or local authority control. Fifty per cent of respondents believed that they should be responsible to the Minister of Safety and Security at national level, while 20 % felt they should receive their instructions from the provincial minister. Eighteen per cent felt that the local community should give instructions to the police. One would imagine that black respondents would have made up the bulk of this latter category, but interestingly, they were the least amenable to community control. Twenty-six per cent of coloured members favoured community control, 20 % of white members and 13 % of black members. The rest of the respondents (12 %) were undecided. However, no-one was prepared to extend similar powers to the municipality, perhaps a reflection of reservations about the legitimacy of the old form of municipal authority, and uncertainty of the new.[22]

There are other factors that reflect a possible reluctance on the part of members to accept change. While only nine per cent of the respondents were against affirmative action programmes, the percentage in favour (57 %) was not sufficient to indicate a positive trend. Another somewhat disturbing feature was that less than half the respondents were aware of the Interim Constitution's provisions regarding the police service. Forty-seven per cent were aware of the provisions, 27 % were not, and 23 % indicated that they were not sure. This finding should be compared with a similar question on the service's strategic plan: only 33 % were fully aware of it, 20 % were not and the rest were unsure (37 %) or registered no reply (11 %). If people are not aware of what is required of them they are unlikely to take any steps to achieve the organization's and society's goals.

Respondents' attitudes to change can be divided into two broad categories. As far as the overall image and ethos of the service is concerned, respondents appear to be somewhat resistant to change. However, they are more flexible about changes in non-structural areas, as evidenced by the attitudes towards community policing and participatory management. It is in this latter area that important steps towards complete transformation of the service can be taken. By involving particular sectors within the service, management would not only provide vital experience and guidance to those who were excluded in the past, but the process would also impact on structural issues such as the overall representivity of management and leadership within the service. Management should grab the opportunity to utilize the existing goodwill and enthusiasm towards such changes.

Conclusion

There are a number of important tendencies and counter-tendencies within the service at present. The majority of the police in Grahamstown support the community-policing initiative

and there is a clear sense of pride among all members in belonging to the organization. Most respondents placed high value on the need for professionalism and for maintaining high standards.

Perlmutter (1991) notes that armed services, such as the police, have two faces.[23] On the one hand, there is a sizable professional group of technical specialists who undergo rigorous training and who are judged by their peers and clients according to their proficiency and skill. This aspect creates a strong emphasis on comradeship and a sense of organizational belonging. On the other hand, the service is a rigidly hierarchical component of the state sector. It is both a hierarchy and a bureaucracy, with a corresponding management style. Both faces are reflected in the respondents' answers and many of the answers can be attributed to the fact that people who consider themselves to be specialists do not like interference in their work from outsiders. This can also explain respondents' attitudes towards the possible political alliances of police unions.

More attention has to be devoted to assessing exactly what constitutes this sense of professional identity, and how it can be accommodated alongside the community-policing policy. If this is not done, resistance to change may arise. This resistance will not necessarily be open and apparent: it is more likely to take the form of inertia.

However, apartheid created divisions not only between police and community, but also within the service. The survey revealed some of the tensions within the bureaucracy, as it undergoes transition. Many of the more junior ranks believe that racist practices persist and that there are tensions between police officers from different racial backgrounds. Auxiliary (non-uniformed) labourers in particular believe that there has been little change in attitudes since the elections. Management, on the other hand, appears to be unaware of this or prefers to ignore this problem. Clearly, community policing involves not only the closing of divisions between police and community, but also of the divisions within the service.

Coterminous with this is another division between members who fully grasp and who are committed to the changes in approach and those who are uncertain or opposed to the community-policing initiative. It should not be assumed that only white members are opposed to change. There is also opposition among the predominantly black lower ranks who theoretically would be the first to reap the fruits of an improved relationship with the community. This division may be due to poor communication, but it also reflects possible distrust of the community-policing initiative's origins and the motives of those who propound it. This distrust will be overcome only if the sceptical group feels that the service has truly transformed.

Participatory management appears to be the flavour of the month among all ranks, but there is little evidence that it is implemented in practice. Mechanisms of consultation and accountability within the service have to become more effective. However, improved communication is not the only solution: it should also be recognized that junior and civilian personnel are indeed stakeholders whose careers depend upon the successful application of the new policy. Effort must therefore be made to encourage input from the lower ranks, to promote equality of opportunity.

The service is entering a crucial period in which community policing needs to develop from a public relations exercise into a professional policing policy. On the whole the Grahamstown police appears ready to meet the challenge. Success in achieving this objective will be the best way in which to overcome any insecurity among staff during the transition period.

Endnotes

1 The survey upon which this article is based would not have been possible in the past. We wish to record our thanks to Colonel De Klerk, the District Commissioner for the Grahamstown District, Major Terblanche, the Station Commander of the Grahamstown Police Station and Colonel Meistre and his staff of the Community Relations Division, Grahamstown, for being prepared to venture into uncharted waters and for assisting us in the process.

2 Section 219(1)(b) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993.

3 Cape Times 28/08/1992.

4 Weekend Argus 14/11/1992.

5 Cape Times 21/04/1994.

6 Cape Times 23/10/1992.

7 Cape Times 31/03/1994.

8 Chapter 14 of the Interim Constitution.

9 For more detail, see Hildegard Limson, The Investigation of a Rape Case in Grahamstown: An Evaluation of Police Procedures, unpublished LLB research paper, Rhodes University (1994).

10 Bailey, K. 1982. Methods of Social Research p181-220 notes that while self-administered and interviewed administerial questionnaires may have different merits and demerits, research indicates that both are valid methods that will, in almost all cases, yield similar results, although the latter will tend to have somewhat lower response rates.

11 A more detailed analysis of union affiliation is conducted below.

12 Twelve out of 43 respondents.

13 One out of 40 respondents.

14 Three out of seven respondents.

15 Police assistants often bore the brunt of community protests during the apartheid era. Membership of POPCRU give them not only a collective voice but also, as a result of that union's political alliances, a greater effective legitimacy within the community.

16 Although a significant percentage of respondents did not answer this question, this could be attributed to the manner in which it was framed.

17 The percentages in this table have been calculated column wise.

18 The structure of the community-police forum in Grahamstown is perhaps different from those in other parts of the country. Attendance at meetings and participation therein is not limited in any way. Any member of the public or of the police is therefore able to attend meetings.

19 Twenty per cent of respondents who attended forum meetings were uncertain whether or not they occupied management positions.

20 A feature in this instance was the high percentage (43 %) of POPCRU members who failed to answer the question of forum attendance.

21 Investigating officers (11 %), patrol duties (12 %) and charge office duties (10 %).

22 The ultimate structure and composition of local authority in Grahamstown and surrounding centres was uncertain at the time of the survey.

23 Perlmutter, A. 1991. *The Military and Politics in Recent Times*. London: Frank Cass 5.

11

CONFLICT IN EDUCATION

REJOICE NGCONGO *

This contribution discusses a few issues which have contributed to the emergence of conflict in education. It begins with a discussion of conflict as it relates to the education of blacks before 1994. This is followed by a review of the factors which give rise to current conflicts in education in the country and especially in education in KwaZulu-Natal. A few recommendations on the way forward in the management of conflicts in education in South Africa conclude this contribution.

Conflict in education before April 1994

Before 1994, education for blacks in South Africa was riddled with many problems and conflicts. These problems emanated from an education policy which was formulated by an illegitimate government. Many of the conflicts in education experienced at that time centred around a resistance to an illegitimate government. As a result of these policies, schools for certain communities such as African and coloured communities had neither adequate resources nor curricula: This generated intense conflict.

Ngcongo (1995), in discussing conflicts in schools, concludes that such conflicts are caused essentially by unsatisfied human needs. These can be students' or teachers' needs or both. In addition to unsatisfied human needs that result from issues at national policy level, there are conflicts which are caused by factors at a school level. The students' lack of identification with and involvement in school management, as well as a limited scope to succeed and be fulfilled through school are seen as contributory factors to conflicts. Ngcongo also suggests that teachers in schools mostly use power-based methods to control or discipline students and manage conflicts with students. These methods, she argues, often precipitate or aggravate conflicts in schools.

The scenario in South Africa has changed with the emergence of a new dispensation. While there are different and to some extent reduced levels of conflict in education, there is still conflict. This results from factors at different levels – school, regional and national. The next section identifies some of the predominant factors from which current forms of conflict in education emanate.

The relationship between the national and provincial governments

Prior to April 1994, the national government determined critical components of education. Not only did it set policy, as all governments do, it determined national standards as well as

* Prof. Rejoice Ngcongo, Department of Educational Planning and Administration: University of Zululand.

curricula. Many conflicts developed largely because the government that dictated such crucial components of education was illegitimate and also because policy decisions handed down to schools were unacceptable. While the Government of National Unity enjoys legitimacy, there seem to be many tensions between the different structures and provinces. These tensions impact on education. Two points illustrate this observation.

The first is the question of centralization versus decentralization of power between regions and the national government. The issue of centralization versus decentralization revolves around who controls resources and on the decision-making powers of regions versus the state. This creates tension between provinces and the state. KwaZulu-Natal is an example. At the moment KwaZulu-Natal wants more powers from the central government in line with the philosophy of provincial autonomy and federalism which the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) espouses. The IFP is the majority party in the province and favours federalism. Recently, the IFP objected to the Education Act because they perceived it as a threat to provincial authority. The tension between the national and provincial levels thus inhibits the smooth transformation of education.

Another example of the effect of tension between the national government and the government of KwaZulu on education is suggested by Ngakane (1995). In his article entitled "Province unlikely to pass crucial education bill this year", Ngakane mentions the indecision which marks the KwaZulu-Natal Education Department. The Provincial Bill of Education may not be passed this year for various reasons. Moreover, Ngakane maintains that the Provincial Minister of Education has expressed reluctance to present the bill for debate until the National Education Bill, which is tied up in the Constitutional Court, has been passed.

There is no visible reconstruction and development in schools in KwaZulu-Natal and perhaps in other regions as well. One of the contributory factors to this problem relates to the tensions between the state and provincial government as well as the resultant flow of money from these levels to the schools.

The second point is the question of apparent conflicting party policies and party values. These influence and determine educational debates and bring with them conflicts in education. As a result, education is contested on political rather than on educational grounds. Again the Education Bill illustrates this point. The bill is surrounded with many controversies. According to Schedule 6 of the bill, the minister has powers to set norms and standards. Some parties in the Government of National Unity seem to believe that the bill gives the Minister of Education powers to override provincial policies on education. There is also an observation that there was not enough time for the bill to be discussed. Intense opposition to the bill came from the National Party (NP), the Democratic Party (DP) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). Such objections, which seem based on party values, create conflict in education. The African National Congress (ANC) argues that the act is essential to address issues of equity and that the NP and DP appear to bend towards the protection of individual rights. Education thus continues to be contested on political rather than educational grounds.

Restructuring of education process

Following the establishment of a single national education system, strategic management teams were set up to facilitate rationalization. The Interim Provincial Strategic and Planning

Committee (IPSPC) was set up in KwaZulu-Natal. Initially, this body consisted of the heads of the Departments of Education that existed up to 1994. This body was perceived to be unrepresentative since other stakeholders such as teacher organizations, inspectors of schools and others were not initially represented. In a sense the process of restructuring has had conflict undertones in terms of representation.

It has also not been a harmonious process. Firstly, the pace at which the process was driven in KwaZulu-Natal did not allow time for some groups to consult with their constituencies to ensure that they represented their view or their organizations. Secondly, in the project task group in which the author serves it is not clear whether both the privileged and underprivileged receive sufficient consideration. An example will illustrate the statement. A number of meetings was held in Durban. Participants were notified by fax. It is difficult for people without the necessary facilities such as a fax and telephone to attend. People who come from remote rural areas are similiarly disadvantaged as they cannot always have their representative(s) present at such meetings. Furthermore, the pace of restructuring and the communication system make it difficult for decisions to filter to the grassroots level. There seems to be a high degree of ignorance and dissatisfaction at the grassroots level about the pace of restructuring. It is doubtful whether people at grassroots level have been able to understand and take ownership of decisions taken in the restructuring process. The pace of restructuring therefore tends to create problems which can result in conflicts in education.

Positions on types of schools

In KwaZulu-Natal the Project Task Group on Legislation cannot agree on the type of schools that the province will use. Some want state, state-aided and private schools. The Draft Bill on Education of the province of KwaZulu-Natal favours the above categories of schools. Yet some people in the Project Task Group on Education want only state and private schools. The *Report of the Review Committee on the Organisation, Governance and Funding of Schools* (1995) also recommends two types of schools. So the potential for conflict regarding types of schools still remains.

Is there a way forward and can the above-mentioned conflict be managed?

Conflict can be a very healthy mechanism to bring about change in education. However, it is important to keep it to manageable levels. In doing so, political parties need to know that, while education cannot be neutral, it may not be the weapon for political games. Failure to note this creates problems for society and for the students who are the future human resource.

Furthermore, there is a need for open and truly inclusive debates on many issues in education. Forums which represent stakeholders in education are necessary. The co-ordination of such forums and the facilitation of the process of discussions must take into consideration problems of the First and Third World and allow sufficient time for communication within constituencies. People at grassroots level may not be left behind, as seems to be the case at the moment.

Research in conflict management and resolution

There is a need for ongoing research into conflict management and resolution in education. The field of conflict studies in education in South Africa is not yet established. Such research needs to support the process of transformation in education and to assist all stakeholders to deliver productive education at all times.

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12

CONFLICT AND EMPOWERMENT OF THE YOUTH

JOHAN OLIVIER *

A survey of the past century makes it clear that South Africa's youth have been victims of political, economic and social crises for much of this period. The vast majority have grown up in poverty and have been subjected to blatant political manipulation on racial and other divisions. It is fair to say that South Africa's youth have for many years been largely ignored by the leaders in control of their destiny. This all changed during the 1970s when the youth propelled themselves onto the political centre stage - a position they occupied since that time.

The important role that the youth have claimed for themselves in the South African society generally and politics specifically, stimulated a great deal of research into various youth-related issues during the past few years (see, for example, Seekings, 1993; Everatt 1994; Slabbert et al., 1994). The most pervasive observation arising from this research is the diversity, fragmentation and polarization of South African youth on the one hand, and the need for a common purpose or unity on the other.

This contribution begins with a brief review of the major indicators of the fragmentation and diversity present among South Africa's youth. Next we turn our attention to the youth's past involvement in political behaviour (conflict) and demonstrate how fragmentation impacted on their political conduct and related matters. Key areas for future research are identified in the concluding section.

Unity and diversity

Previous research makes it abundantly clear that "the South African youth" by no means represent a monolithic group of individuals. There is, for example, no single "youth culture" in South Africa. Rather, diversity is one of the single most important characteristics of young people in this country.

It should however be recognized that much of this diversity is the result of past government policies designed to divide the country's population - what one could refer to as destructive diversity. However, there does exist a great deal of diversity that is the result of normal societal processes. Since this type of diversity invariably enriches any society it is referred to here as constructive diversity.

The challenge that faces South Africa at this time is, on the one hand, to address destructive diversity and its consequences in such a way that it will unite and not divide further. On the

* Dr. Johan Olivier, Centre for Socio-political Analysis: Human Sciences Research Council.

other hand, the challenge is to create the space for those societal processes that will enrich the constructive diversity in our society. What is needed is a "creative tension" between those strategies that strengthen unity and those that are sensitive to the diversity needs of society.

The current exists within the South African youth and comes to the fore in variable levels of economic, social and political deprivation, urban-rural divisions, gender and cultural diversity. Much of the remainder of this contribution highlights some of the key indicators of this diversity.

Key characteristics of South African youth

"The South African youth" have been referred to on several occasions in the discussion up to now. But who are they? For the purposes of this contribution youths is defined as those individuals who find themselves in the 15 to 30 age bracket. The following are some of the key characteristics of this group of people:

- The 1991 census statistics suggest that 29 % of South Africa's total population falls within the 15 to 30 age bracket. Of this group 75 % are African, 12 % white, 10 % coloured and 3 % Asian.
- Youths and children (those individuals younger than 15 years of age) represent two-thirds (66 %) of the total population. This shows that South Africa has, and will continue to have for quite some time, a young population.
- Fifty per cent of South Africa's youth live in urban areas. However, 43 % of all youths were born in rural areas and 32 % were born in smaller towns. About one in four (23 %) were born in metropolitan areas. This suggests that rural lifestyles and urbanization will remain major factors in the lives of many young South Africans.
- About half (49.7 %) are females.
- Disparities in the area of education are well known. Women and Africans are particularly disadvantaged. While the vast majority of white and Asian youth have completed senior secondary education, the majority of coloured and especially African youth have completed only junior secondary education or less.
- The unemployment rate among youth is very high - about 42 %. Women and Africans are particularly disadvantaged in this area as well. The unemployment rate among African youth is 45 % followed by coloureds (40 %), Asians (29 %) and whites (12 %).
- A significant proportion of South Africa's youth lives in poverty. Only about 20% of all youth earned more than R600 per month in 1993. This was true for about 40 % of the white youths and only 12 % of African youths.
- Significant discrepancies exist with regard to housing and services. The vast majority (97 %) of white, coloured and Asian youths live in permanent structures and have access to electricity, running water, refuse removal, tarred roads and street lights. About 20 % of African youths live in shacks and an additional 9 % in huts. Only 47 % of Africans in the higher income bracket have electricity in their homes and 41 % had running water. Using facilities as an important indicator of urbanization. This suggests that many Africans are urbanized in name only.

- As far as family structure is concerned, the results of a recent study (Slabbert, 1994) suggest that 40 % of African families are headed by females. The comparable figures for coloured, Asian and white families are respectively 32 %, 20 % and 22 %.

The realities outlined above are important for our understanding of the dynamics that underlie conflict and the protracted violence to which youth in South Africa have been exposed.

Conflict and violence

Political conflict has been an integral part of South Africa's history for many centuries and dates back to before the arrival of Europeans in the middle of the seventeenth century. However, it was not until the beginning of this century and especially since the 1970s that there was a significant increase in the intensity of political conflict in South Africa.

The injustices of the apartheid system and the system's own inherent weaknesses resulted in a gradual breakdown since the early 1970s. Those excluded from political participation capitalized on the increased permeability of the system and in this way accelerated the ultimate end of the apartheid system.

It was South Africa's youth who played a pivotal role in bringing about socio-political change in this country. From the mid-seventies when black youth first took to the streets to protest against educational concerns, they have mobilised increasingly against social, economic and political oppression. They continued to assert their position in society up to the April 1994 elections.

The last decade saw a dramatic increase in levels of political competition in South Africa as new political actors entered the political arena. Levels of political violence increased throughout this period as competition became more intense. Official statistics suggest that more than 20 000 people lost their lives in political conflict since 1984. Youth and children were frequently not only the victims of such events but were often the initiators. Much of this conflict and violence was restricted to black neighbourhoods.

It is important to recognize that conflict and violence are processes and not necessarily single events. Therefore, violence can be one act in isolation or a series of acts over an extended period of time. Two types of violence can be distinguished, namely physical violence and structural violence. Whether such violence presents itself as a particular incident or series of incidents, violence impacts on the victim(s), their families and the communities in which they live. This is especially true for black South Africans generally and youth more specifically. In this regard it is important to note that those individuals who are youths today, grew up during the most violent period of South African history.

The apartheid policies of the previous government subjected the whole black population to various forms of structural violence over an extended period. This comes to the fore in the following:

- Poor physical environments (e.g. overcrowding, family breakdown, lack of access to services such as health care and utilities).
- The urban-rural divide referred to above. This to a large extent is the result of enforced migratory patterns.

- Urbanization. The migrant labour system had a destructive effect on community life and other support systems.
- Youth make up a significant proportion of people living in informal settlements and are exposed to overcrowding and crime/violence.
- Economic conditions. The large unemployment rate among youth is largely the result of past policies that excluded significant proportions of South Africans from relevant educational opportunities. This in turn had negative consequences for economic growth. Unemployment ultimately impacts on a person's self-esteem and feeling of usefulness.

White youth in South Africa found themselves insulated from many of the negative consequences of apartheid policies. They had very little knowledge or understanding of the harsh realities of township life that confronted the vast majority of black youth. Youth who grew up in the white neighbourhoods of South Africa could fully participate in parliamentary politics if they wished to do so. Black youths, as was true for black adults, had to resort to extra-parliamentary means to assert themselves politically. Indeed, white and black youths under apartheid lived in different worlds.

The divisions that developed as a result of the apartheid policies had a series of negative consequences for youth in particular. These consequences included the following:

- Members of different population groups became isolated and insulated from one another. This resulted in the development of stereotypes, a lack of understanding and a virtual absence of meaningful cross-cultural communication as equals.
- High levels of intolerance (disrespect for diversity), racism among significant proportions of especially the white population.
- Lack of a democratic culture. There was no uniform understanding and experience of what was meant by "democracy".
- Variable levels of involvement in politics. Black youth were politically more involved/ active than white youth.
- The rural-urban divide referred to above had a series of negative consequences. Urban youth were more involved and exposed to politics and violence. Rural youth were more under the influence of traditional/conservative socializing agents.
- The protracted political violence had a series of negative effects that impacted on education and relationships between youth and older generation (an ideological cleavage developed) especially in the black communities. Black youth rarely discussed politics with their parents.

However, South Africa's youth have not been and are not being exposed to incidents of political violence only. They are increasingly involved in violent crimes. Results of a recent study suggest that the mean age of offenders was 22 years in 1988. By 1990, two years later, it was 17 years. This suggests that the involvement of youth in political violence and crime is so widespread that it cannot be rationalized away. Violence (criminal or political) has become an institutionalized way of settling differences and/or ensuring economic survival in certain areas of the country.

Interventions

The following are key interventions that could be considered:

- Initiatives that will restore the family as one of the most important socializing agents in society should receive high priority.
- Youth development is a collective responsibility of the state and all other stakeholders. This has consequences for the social, economic and political spheres. Women in particular should be particularly targeted as they have a major influence in society.
- There is a great need for initiatives that will promote cross-cultural communication. Simple putting previously isolated groups together will not solve the problem - it can exacerbate it. Therefore, such initiatives should be well structured and managed.
- The role of a variety of socializing agents, e.g. family, school, political parties, peer groups on the values held by the youth. How can these agents be strengthened to undo the negative consequences of exposure to violence on the youth/children.
- The need for democracy training is vital for the strengthening of a democratic culture. Schools, NGOs, political parties and communities have a shared responsibility. It is vital that such training be non-partisan.
- Similarly, general political socialization is as important. Black and African youth are more "politically literate" given their greater involvement in "active" politics in the past. Despite this, there is a lack of understanding of the meaning of some basic concepts, e.g. federalism, how parliament works and the role of government structures and local authorities in a democracy.
- Closely connected to the above is the need to provide the youth and all South Africans with basic conflict resolution skills. Educational institutions and NGOs are best suited for such activities.

Conclusions

A precondition for building one nation (unity) is the development and discovery of those values, objectives and symbols which the different sectors of society share. It is during such a process of discovery that an appreciation for the natural diversity in society will be promoted.

One of the primary functions of education is to promote unity among socially diverse individuals by creating common values, symbols and objectives. The divisive history of South Africa has prevented the development of a common civic ethic. Such an ethic is a precondition for constructive participation in any democracy. Very few young South Africans have been exposed to education that promotes democracy.

Since conflict, and political violence specifically, is a symptom of a problem, we need to have a systemic approach to conflict resolution and empowerment of the youth. Interventions that address conflict and violence in isolation from a whole range of related socio-economic factors will have little success. The challenge is to identify the root causes underlying conflict and violence in society at large and the reasons for the youth's involvement/exposure to it more

specifically - also the consequences of their exposure. Systematic research will enable us to uncover these dynamics and propose effective conflict management strategies.

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13

DEVELOPMENT AND CONFLICT

THELEDI SEBULELA *

Development is a very broad concept. It signals different things to different communities exposed to different situations and living conditions. To some it brings peace and stability by improving the quality of life of a particular community, while others regard it as a threat to peace and stability and sometimes very destructive.

What do we mean by development? For the purposes of this paper, the definition of development is confined to activities designed to improve the quality of life of individuals or communities at large. Such activities can either generate or eradicate conflict. In instances where development generates conflict, the primary objective should be to avert or manage conflict to enhance development. Expectations regarding development are normally not commensurate with the available resources, namely people, finances, materials, etcetera. A backlog of issues impinge on development. Areas where there is no development or inadequate development may be fertile ground for conflict.

An assertion can be made that where there are visible and effective development initiatives, conflict levels become negligible, and that where there is a high level of conflict, development (if any) is inhibited. In both cases people are too preoccupied with either of the two to have divided attention. Furthermore it does not necessarily mean that the first is the answer or solution to the second. In some cases development and conflict operate independently, in others they are closely related.

Various classic examples can be cited where delivery is not visible:

- The housing sector. Public pressure will always be exerted on the government at various levels to deliver, especially when no delivery mechanisms are in place, or no structures to mobilize human resources;
- The role of the financial institutions with respect to the delivery policy (red-lining);
- The role of bureaucracy, which is a top-down approach as opposed to bottom-up;
- The invasion of land by squatter settlements indicates that there is no effective development of the infrastructure;
- Affirmative action policy expectations across the board against fears from the previous job reservation beneficiaries;
- The current wave of public sector strikes for salary parity with the private sector;

* Theledi Sebulela, Senior Researcher, Group Human Resources: Human Sciences Research Council.

- The unemployment rate is very high due to prolonged economic contraction;
- Lack of structures capable of mobilizing resources for labour-intensive projects.

It is likely that if there is no development various forms of conflict will increase in communities.

On the other hand, it may be equally true that development sometimes becomes the source of conflict through control of available resources by individuals or groups. This can only happen if such resources for development are not managed effectively, or even when working relationships among the stakeholders are not clearly defined. It is therefore imperative that negotiated development be on top of the agenda to ensure maximum inclusiveness or co-responsibility.

Development requires well-organized structures within communities to ensure co-ordinated action. It needs socially accepted standards of measurement by which communities can judge whether and what progress is being made towards the achievement of intended goals to uplift the quality of their lives.

Due to the lack of efficient structures to mobilize human resources and the growing unemployment rate some people resort to survival skills. The self-employment survival skills are sometimes nurtured by

- creative survival solutions such as hawking, spaza shops, etc., arise from a lack of accelerated development initiatives;
- inaccessibility of resources, maybe due to "unwarranted" bureaucracy. Hence the perceived tardy implementation of the RDP policy;
- a wide capacity-building gap on life skills;
- tight economic conditions in the country, and
- illegal immigrants who flock into the country offering cheap labour.

In summary, the potential research theme of "development and conflict" has been identified in view of the gradual shift after the general election of April 1994 from political conflict to the bread and butter issues of improving the quality of peoples' lives. The above shift has not, however, occurred in KwaZulu-Natal where suspected political conflicts still ravage the province, though not at the rate before the general elections of 1994.

It is in this spirit that development is gradually gaining the centre stage. However, most of the promises that were made have not yet been fulfilled. It is clear that development issues will pose a significant conflict management challenge in the coming years, far beyond the interim period. In general, conflict is going to be more experienced around development issues than in the political scenario. This does not mean that development should be given scant attention or that it is unavoidable to provoke conflict. It may in most cases bring constructive conflicts. Obviously if there are no contingency plans to manage development then some form of conflict should be expected.

Lastly, the National Development Agency has been established to channel the necessary funds to different NGOs, some of which are duplicating development initiatives. It remains to be

seen whether this will be a viable solution to the cash-strapped NGOs and help to pre-empt conflict.

Where should research be concentrated?

How does conflict impinge on development or vice versa?

In the prevailing circumstances in our country, how do we merge or else draw a line between philosophy and pragmatism in development? For instance, how do we put an appropriate overall approach to this systematic survey the fears and uncertainties of investors and investment analysts?

One of the primary areas of research should be the ethical field:

- Managing ethics should be the central issue. It has been observed that there is a lack of understanding of this field. This assertion is backed by the fact that there are about two or three people in the country who are studying ethics at postgraduate level (PhD);
- Work ethics based primarily on productivity. South Africa cannot be compared, for instance, with the Far Eastern countries. The essence here is "what motivates people to accept responsibility"? It is further observed that in the development field there are very few people in the country who are capable of accepting responsibility.

Another issue is the RDP's delivery on its promises. Development is the integral part of the RDP. It is a vehicle to encourage massive growth. The question of the type of management skills and life or survival skills also come under focus. Problems experienced by other countries in Africa were highlighted, especially at the point of colonization and decolonization.

For instance when the colonialists put into place and maintained an immense infra-structure, the needs should have been basic education and health care and even capacity building.

What about the quality of living? Should we simply be complacent with the "fairly high or highest" standard of life we have in the old South Africa as our own or can't some research tackle this issue? There is a glaring dichotomy in our country, which may be referred to as the "double background", that is, very rich minority against a hopelessly poor majority - the "privileged insider against the underprivileged old outsider". Are the rich (mostly whites) not prepared to lower their living standards in order to uplift the lives of the underprivileged?

There seems to be general agreement that whoever conducts research, either from the inside or outside, should be objective, without bias or vested interest in the findings which should further be put under validity scrutiny. The simple reason is that if an outsider conducts that type of research she/he may be perceived by the insider as a threat. Alternatively, if research is conducted by the insider she/he may be perceived as trying to safeguard her/his group's privileges.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are made regarding conflict and development:

- Models for reconciliation should be developed.
- We should take stock of what is working at the moment.

- We should investigate in which areas development works.
- We must set clear definitions of what we mean by development before embarking on research.
- We should also identify areas where research and development are taking place in the context of conflict resolution.
- The role of the state should also be clarified.

Conclusion

Conflict in development can be alleviated if it is an all-inclusive affair with the relevant stakeholders. This implies that all interested parties that may be affected by development should be approached and not only the visible or popular parties. In most cases inequalities tend to feed on conflict - even unequal treatment or uneven allocation of resources.

14

LABOUR CONFLICT

RENÉE DU TOIT *

Since the trade unions were first legally recognized in 1979, considerable attention has been given to managing conflict in the labour field and in organizations. This can be seen in the numerous training programmes developed to train management and trade union representatives in negotiation and conflict management, and the considerable number of consultancy businesses offering advice on labour issues. Furthermore there has been a significant growth in literature pertaining to labour/industrial relations. Extensive research has been conducted on issues in the labour field.

Recently published research on labour relations in South Africa seems to focus mainly on five issues, namely (1) the implementation of affirmative action, (2) training of both management and employees to cope with the rapid changes taking place in organizations and in the country, (3) restructuring the labour movement to adapt to a new role in the post-election era, (4) health and safety issues, and (5) productivity.

The implementation of affirmative action

The implementation of affirmative action is currently receiving the most attention. Jane Castle (1995:6-7) states: "Like many other countries, South Africa faces the problem of removing deep-rooted inequalities in the workplace. Yet few countries face the problem in such stark dimensions as South Africa". She emphasizes the huge problems encountered because of skills shortages, which often prevent the successful implementation of affirmative action programmes. She also points out that there are very few successful role-models for the successful implementation of affirmative action in South Africa to learn from.

Three of the main concerns about the implementation of affirmative action programmes seem to be (1) what Van Wyk (1994:7) refers to as "affirmative action promotions" versus "meritorious promotions", questioning the fairness of affirmative action promotions, (2) what McDonald (1994:41) describes as "how to effectively change the colour of South Africa's management", and (3) the attitudes of employees towards black advancement, as highlighted by the research of Mkwanazi and Rall (1994).

Renée du Toit and Karin Fourie of the Human Sciences Research Council have recently completed a research project on trade union involvement in the implementation of affirmative action programmes, providing fascinating inputs from both management and trade union representatives on how they see the role and involvement of trade unions in the implementation of affirmative action programmes in organizations.

* Renée du Toit, Group Human Resources: Human Sciences Research Council

Training

Training of both management and employees to cope with the rapid changes taking place in organizations and in the country is another area of focus. The great need for education and training, and the vast skills shortages in the country, make the addressing of this issue critically important. One manager interviewed by Du Toit stated, "We would dearly love to make affirmative action appointments in our division, but we are in a very specialized field. We just can not find people with the necessary skills to appoint". Incidents such as the recent dispute between the National Union of Mineworkers and the Chamber of Mines about paid education and training leave emphasized the need to address this issue. Trade unions seem to recognize that affirmative action appointments are problematic because of desperate skills shortages in the country and most of them feel, therefore, that this problem should be addressed by focusing on education and training at all levels - from literacy training to management and supervisory training. What seems to be happening in practice, however, is that each organization and or trade union addresses this problem in its own way. There is a serious lack of co-ordinated efforts to address the problem of skills shortages and the need for education and training nationally or even at industry level.

Restructuring of the labour movement

The third issue addresses the problem of the restructuring of labour movement. In the post-election era, the labour movement is faced with the challenge of restructuring itself and adapting to a new role, moving away from its previous, largely political role. During the interviews conducted by Du Toit and Fourie many of the trade union officials admitted that they had not yet had the time to address issues such as affirmative action, because they had been too busy with internal restructuring after the election. Sakhela Buhlungu (1994) highlights a serious problem currently experienced in trade union circles, which he calls the "brain drain", referring to trade union leaders leaving trade unions to seek alternative employment. This problem partly relates to the difficulties experienced by trade unions to restructure effectively. The restructuring that is taking place, however, seems to be uncoordinated, with trade unions desperately seeking information at the moment on how to do this successfully, which of course opens up tremendous opportunities for future research.

Health and safety

There seems to be serious concern and renewed interest at the moment in the area of health and safety. Not only are research reports and articles being published on the position of HIV-positive/AIDS employees in South African companies, but trade unions still regularly raise their voices about unsafe working conditions. The recent AECI-SACWU dispute about eight people who died at the Modderfontein plant and various recent disputes about people who died in mining accidents are examples of this. While chanting slogans such as "Health before profits!" trade unions are also taking on NOSA about their rating system. It is not surprising that some trade unions are starting to conduct their own research on health and safety issues. The whole issue of HIV-positive employees and their status in organizations can certainly be expected to receive a fair amount of attention in future.

Many other issues, such as productivity and the introduction of the new Labour Relations Act, currently feature in the labour field. In general the labour field is well researched and a significant amount of research has been published over the past few years. It is important, however, that research continues to be conducted in this dynamic and rapidly changing field, where new issues constantly appear that need to be dealt with.

Future research issues in the labour field

In response to the question: "What issues in the labour field can be expected to be researched, or should be researched in future?", one participant to the national workshop commented that, apart from two short articles recently in the South African Journal of Labour Relations about the two trade unions in the South African Police Service (SAPS), very little is being published about labour relations in the SAPS and even the public sector.

Concern about the following issues was raised by participants:

- Although articles are being written about issues in the labour field, relatively little scientific research is actually being published.
- Specific aspects of the labour field seem to be under-researched. Trade unions are currently being led by a totally new generation of leaders. They are moving away from their previous political role and seem to be uncertain about how to do this and what their goals should be. Aspects such as these are grossly under-researched.
- Management seems to be closing its doors to research. This viewpoint was supported by a number of the participants. While management seems to be wary of participating in research at the moment, trade unions seem to welcome it, indicating a desperate need for new knowledge and skills to improve their functioning.
- Parallels between the labour movement and developments in communities are not always recognized, with the result that lessons learnt in one area are not applied to other areas as well.

The following areas for research were identified:

- The democratizing of the workplace and of management: Management still seems to be dominated by white Afrikaans males, and research should be conducted into new management styles for South African organizations.
- The introduction of the new Labour Relations Act, which will provide challenging opportunities for research, such as the implications for strike handling, the management of precedents set by the previous Act, etcetera: There is concern that certain groups, such as the essential emergency services, seem to be excluded from the new Labour Relations Act.
- Access of trade unions dealing with farm workers and domestic workers to their members: Recent research has indicated great difficulties in this area and further research should be conducted to help them to address this problem.
- Labour relations problems experienced in small businesses need to be addressed urgently.

- Considerable developments that are taking place currently in the trade union federations (COSATU, NACTU, FITU AND FEDSAL), with much conflict apparently being experienced among these federations: This opens up interesting opportunities for research.
- Problems currently being experienced in the labour field with recruiting agencies, and the conflict surrounding their operation.
- In view of the changing role of trade unions, a re-examination of the role of shop stewards.
- The issue of illegal immigrants and their position in the South African labour force.
- The role of psychological assessment and its applicability to recruitment and selection. Issues such as the validity, transparency and norms of test instruments should receive special attention.
- With the entrance of world class manufacturers into the South African economy, the introduction of new technology and its influence on the labour force should be examined.
- Research on productivity.

Conclusion

In summary it should be emphasized that researchers in the labour field are faced with interesting challenges and problems, such as management, which does not seem keen at this stage to open its doors to researchers. This may be an indication of problems being experienced in management circles. Serious problems are also experienced in the labour movement, such as the need for internal restructuring and a clear definition of its future role.

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15

CONFLICT, CO-OPERATION AND CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA

PETER CUNNINGHAM *

In these times of social transformation there are as many challenges as opportunities to rectify past inequalities and achieve a more just society. The current situation invites debate through research into a number of very pertinent issues relating to conflict and peace. In terms of this, the following represents an opening of discourse rather than a comprehensive exposition of each of the issues discussed. As the process of change unfolds, every facet of South African society displays islands of both conflict and peace. To maintain the momentum of peaceful change requires the integration, linking and reinforcement of these areas of peace while simultaneously recognising that conflict is inherent in a changing society.

Power *for* versus power *over*

To date there has been little research into elites in South Africa. Research has mostly been restricted to either political or economic actors as case studies rather than more comprehensive work on elite formation, influence and possible change. Concomitantly, "power" as a variable in social analysis is not well developed in South African social research. This requires an examination of issues pertaining to power relations, their nature and dynamic, the presence or absence of power *for* or power *over* people in the "new" South Africa, as well as other structures and processes that are either latent or overt expressions of power. A consequence of this consideration is the question: Have power relations changed in South Africa since the inception of the Government of National Unity? Not only is this related to ideological considerations but also to explanations of the nature of current social relations. Conceptualizing and researching power is inherently difficult and requires an integrated and multidisciplinary approach.

Conflict and policy formulation

Social change is often incorrectly restricted to a specific event such as a revolution or a specific date in the minds of people, rather than a process of gradual or evolutionary change - measurement of change is thereby restricted to what society was like prior to that event or date and that which currently exists. If change is not placed in a historical context, it leads to a misperception of what changed and the degree of change. One possible outcome of this is that society becomes locked into the process of policy formulation rather than policy implementation. Social transformation becomes linked to the fulfilment of raised aspirations combined with a questioning by the populace of who the major beneficiaries of change have

* Prof. Peter Cunningham, Department of Sociology: University of Port Elizabeth.

been. If in this process there is the perception that change has advantaged one group at the expense of another and that there is no moral justification for this, conflict will intensify.

In time change under these conditions, becomes negatively defined and the newly created situation, irrespective of its moral integrity, becomes the object of conflict. It is therefore important for all stake holders to know on an ongoing basis how people perceive the "newly" formulated policy. This requires greater co-ordination of policy research. Similarly, greater interaction between policy formulators and researchers is also required.

Conflict and co-operation as mutually exclusive

Until the 1970s South Africa's ruling ideology theoretically defined itself in terms of a consensual and integrative model. Consequently, conflict was regarded as negative and an abrogation of the policy of "separate but equal development". Any expression of conflict was therefore suppressed in the belief that the causal issues represented only a temporary imbalance in the system, the viability of which depended on the restoration of equilibrium at all costs.

Strikes and conflict in the political and educational sphere were defined as being perpetrated by opportunists and agitators and not as representing a valid tenet of democracy. However, the importance of the "functional" consequences of conflict was only conceded by business and the state during the 1970s and 1980s as labour and, later, political organizations began to challenge the idea that change could only occur gradually and peacefully. The debate then shifted to creating the rules in terms of which conflict could be legitimated - with the rules themselves becoming a source of conflict. Democracy was defined in terms of tolerance of the expression of such conflict.

Gradually in the 1980s conflict assumed an increasing validity in explaining and understanding social transformation to such an extent that co-operation, integration and peace became increasingly neglected in debate. Conflict and co-operation became mutually exclusive terms. Conflict was seen to be inherent in all social relations and consequently defined as good. Stability, integration and co-operation were conceptualized in negative terms. As a consequence social relations became defined in adversarial terms. A win-lose approach to social change was seen as the only alternative to achieve democracy.

Violence both towards property and people became tolerated as a means to achieve "just" ends. The use of unjust means was seen as preferable to an unjust system. In this process a culture of violence became endemic to all social institutions. For the majority of the population conflict was defined as the "best" way to achieve change. A generation of young people was socialized into believing that conflict represented the only way of resolving differences. During the 1990s, with political change having been attained, it is now required of society to re-orientate itself into a realization that conflict and co-operation are equally important to social development. Conflict and peace have to be seen as the same side of a coin and not as opposite sides. This requires extensive re-socialization of individuals into a realization that (1) institutional means have to be used to attain socially legitimated ends, (2) conflict on its own cannot remain the driving force behind change and (3) stability is not necessarily negative but is rather a positive force for growth, since it provides people with a sense of security counterpoised against the insecurity engendered by prolonged periods of rapid social change and conflict.

Conflict due to the failure to deliver

In this process of rapid social change and lack of delivery on electoral promises, lies the danger that the lack of legitimacy of the past regime will be replaced by lack of credibility in the current Government of National Unity (as it continues to fail to deliver). The maintenance of democracy under these conditions becomes increasingly difficult. Just as capitalism was seen as synonymous with apartheid in the past, so democracy will be seen as synonymous with corruption, civil unrest, intolerable levels of crime, rising unemployment and elite formations, this latter point being reinforced by the ever-widening gap between rich and poor.

A "new" value system

Two decades of violent social, political and economic confrontation followed by a peaceful transition, have reinforced the position that the majority of South Africans have the tenacity and political will to deal with change. Nevertheless, little is known about the "new" value system that is emerging - a value system once stigmatized and defined, especially in the case of the Afrikaner, as rigid and inflexible is now showing itself able to adapt to the insecurity of the unknown.

An understanding of values and, more broadly, value systems, is central to an understanding of a society. This understanding is even more necessary in our society which is characterized by a necessity for tolerance of cultural diversity and a respect for minority rights. If this is the case, where do cultures diverge and where are they similar? Is there potential for greater cultural divergence and conflict? Theoretically and empirically this still remains a grey area. The answers are often couched in generalizations, clichés or untested propositions.

The qualitative-quantitative debate as regards attaining clarity on these issues continues to elude many social scientists. Consequently, issues like the rescinding of the death penalty, abortion and "the language issue" remain sources of social tension. This raises further questions concerning the population's current definition and image of capitalism, socialism and other economic models, and whether there has been a shift to more materialism in the South African value system.

Answers to these and similar questions will give social scientists greater insight into whether the social structure of society is transforming itself, and the direction of that transformation. Such knowledge clearly impacts on assessments of the stability or otherwise of the society. In many instances an emerging or strengthening of a middle class value system has a constraining impact on the expression of unrestrained conflict.

Recent events, for example the ban on organ transplants, in the health sector and the response by a segment of the African National Congress are indicative of the lack of a clearly defined value system regarding the expression of conflict. It is therefore important to investigate such inconsistencies, not only to determine whether they are in fact present, but also to determine the role of the media in their expression and definition. Such events broaden the parameters of research to include the effect of the media on value change and formation.

The philosophy behind policy

The negative side of political change in South Africa was an initial stifling of open debate on the direction and content of social policy. Discussion once central to the struggle to transform South Africa, such as that pertaining to "people's education" has been subsumed by an

adherence and subservience to the rationality of the market. The primacy of the goal of economic development and growth has acted as a normative regulator of discourse on many issues. In this lies the potential for conflict, as policy formulation and implementation are no longer debated in the context of an underlying philosophy.

Assuming that the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) is the primary policy document in South Africa's restructuring, this raises a number of questions. Is the RDP still applicable? Has it been tainted to such an extent that it no longer represents a viable programme to drive development in South Africa? Or more concretely, has it become an obstacle to bringing about change because of the unrealistic expectations it has created? Alternatively, does it provide a coherent policy (and/or philosophy) to underpin South Africa's transformation?

That the RDP has a very significant role to play in bringing about social equity should not prevent the continuation of an open debate about its applicability to transform South Africa. Ongoing research can help to shift the media agenda and therefore highlight the issues in the programme that need attention and refinement. In this manner the public will become engaged in the ongoing legitimation of the process of transformation and policy formation. Furthermore, philosophical and sociological insight as providers of theoretical paradigms to interpret change will retain their integrity by showing that both compliance and non-compliance with the principles of the programme are beneficial. This will reinforce the idea that change is a dynamic and ongoing process requiring continual inquiry. Through this a better balance can be achieved between theory and practice. If not, a one-sided bias towards the "reality" only will result in limited long-term advantage.

The actors and structures in the struggle

During the 1970s and more so during the 1980s the independent trade union movement, students, religious groups and other civic organizations were involved in an intense struggle to bring about democracy in South Africa. These groupings were largely united by a common enemy, apartheid. Such unity intensified the level of conflict that was expressed. The gains for the individuals involved were to a large extent secondary to the perceived advantages emanating from such conflict for the society as a whole. In this process of united confrontation against an illegitimate state the majority of people and structures became highly politicized. It is now the responsibility of the current state to harness that political energy. One alternative in this respect is further investigation into the structures and processes involved in community development - such development being one of the barometers of political stability.

Conclusion

The above presents some of the newly emerging dynamics that now challenge social science researchers. Although social research has been ongoing during the transformation, more longitudinal and comparative research is needed to assist in the social reconstruction and development of South Africa. Such research should form part of an integrated holistic perspective to research, making use of issues and indigenously appropriate methods of research.

16

CONCLUSION: THE REALITIES AND CHALLENGES OF CONFLICT AND PEACE RESEARCH

LOUISE NIEUWMEIJER * AND ANITA BURGER *

The field of conflict and peace research in South Africa can be characterized as highly complex and diverse. As the process of change unfolds, every facet of South African society displays moments of conflict and peace. The current situation invites debate through conflict and peace research practised by a variety of disciplines.

South Africans are not a monolithic group of individuals. Indeed, diversity is a major feature of the people in this "rainbow nation". The scholar-practitioners in South Africa have, as a result of the complexity of their research subject, much to teach the rest of the world about the design and implementation of conflict management systems and the institutionalization of conflict intervention of all sorts.

The diversity of the conflict in South Africa is reflected in the nature of the research reported in this work, for example verified knowledge versus unverified observations, macro- versus micro-level research, manifestations of conflict within formal versus informal organizational structures and the different areas in South African society, identified in earlier chapters, which are intimately involved with conflict and peace.

Verified knowledge versus unverified observations

At one end of the research spectrum there is verified knowledge or scientific research and at the other end, unverified observations with the potential value of practical, experience-based observations, comments and suggestions. What is needed are useful analytical frameworks that will allow the inclusion and analysis of the various methodologies used in conflict and peace research in South Africa.

The height, breadth and depth dimensions of research is a useful framework that needs to be explored (see Nieuwmeijer, Chapter 1). A combination of complementary research dimensions and methodologies describe and explain the complexity of South Africa. In some cases the research problem will in itself determine the method to be followed, while the methodology depends on what one wants to do. By determining what should be done, one can formulate the research criteria to be used.

* Dr. Louise Nieuwmeijer, Consultant: Human Sciences Research Council and Executive Director: SOAR, A Centre for Conflict and Communication Management.
* Anita Burger, Industrial Sociologist Consultant: SOAR, A Centre for Conflict and Communication Management.

Another basic way of identifying appropriate research methodology is to determine whether the research will be conducted on a macro- or micro-level and whether it will involve formal and/or informal structures.

Macro- versus micro-level research

Some research on conflict and peace focuses on a macro-level, i.e on South Africa or Southern Africa. The research includes new thinking on security as well as on future threats, which will help shape security policy and the structure of a defence force for South Africa. Such new thinking should according to Nathan (Chapter 8), include the mobilization of resources to forge a new integrated society.

On a micro-level conflict and peace research focuses more on individual and family factors. It includes more in-depth research with the identification of deeper psychological aspects and circumstances (see Van der Merwe, Chapter 5). On micro-level research the different sectors of the population are also analysed to determine whether there are links between the various cultural and religious values and norms that impact on, for example, family interaction (see Van der Merwe, Chapter 5). By looking at different sectors of the population, common reaction to a conflict situation as well as the role of external parties can be examined. This will help researchers to develop a better understanding of the dynamics of conflict and to devise appropriate intervention strategies and services.

Formal versus informal research structures

The nature of the research process and the possibilities for research co-operation between researchers and practitioners will determine whether conflict and peace studies take place within formal or informal structures. This distinction between formal and informal structures will identify the actors, values, institutions and processes involved, the manifestations of conflict, the causes of the conflict, time scales and conflict management processes (see Cloete, Chapter 3).

The background to conflict, the influence of the social environment, attitudes of togetherness and conflict resolution methods used in Africa, are all elements that need to be taken into consideration when studying conflict by means of formal or informal research structures, according to Malan (see Chapter 4). A major outcome of the workshop "Reflection on Conflict and Peace" was the institutionalization of formal conflict or dispute resolution services and the integration of various existing resolution services. Through the institutionalization of these services researchers will be able to identify the appropriate forums and processes for different types of disputes.

Because of the diversity of the disputes that occur on a daily basis, researchers need to determine what their different focus areas will be in order to address and manage the issues or problems at hand.

Focus areas of conflict and peace research

The diversity of conflict and peace research in South Africa is most apparent when one looks at the different areas that researchers focus their studies on. Some of these areas are:

- Education, where the school curricula are one of the major concerns for future education (Ncgongo, Chapter 11);
- The South African Police Service, with the dire need for new structures and policies to guide present and future decisions and to assist in the process of transition, reconciliation and reconstruction (Midgley, Chapter 10);
- The youth who have been victims of political, economic and social crises for many years, and the role they have claimed for themselves in South African society has stimulated a great deal of research into various youth-related issues during the past few years (Olivier, Chapter 12);
- The labour field where training of management and unions in negotiation and conflict management skills has become essential for the growth of organizations (Du Toit, Chapter 14);
- Development, and whether it promotes peace or creates conflict (Sebulela, Chapter 13).

Information on all these areas is gathered, formally and/or informally, on a macro- or a micro-level through scientific research or by means of unverifiable observations.

Although the diversities in South African society and in research approaches are clearly evident, it is the commonalities that often keep both society and researchers together.

Commonalities of conflict and peace research in South Africa

The major points in common in conflict and peace research that emerged during the workshop, which are reflected in the previous chapters of this book, are

- the interdependence of researchers and practitioners for the success of future research;
- the diversity of cultural and religious values and norms as a source of conflict;
- the real needs of communities and individuals should be taken into consideration during research;
- making people part of the research process, involving them and giving feedback to communities on research findings, empowering them to participate willingly in research and not just as subjects but trying to build research capacity among the people;
- the need for institutionalized conflict resolution services and the integration of existing forums and services, making them user friendly for communities, and
- the commitment to research through the establishment of a database for use by all researchers.

In the light of these diversities and commonalities the realities of conflict and peace research in South Africa should be kept in mind as they can help determine what challenges to accept.

Realities of conflict and peace research in South Africa

The realities of the conflict and peace in South African society are reflected in the diversities and commonalities discussed above. Because South African researchers in this field are often involved in practical interventions more so than their counterparts in other countries, the

research reflects the realities. For example, the predominant research genre in European countries such as the Netherlands and Germany is laboratory-type research. A single micro-variable is isolated and extensively studied. The relation between this variable and the macro-reality is, however, rarely established. The research therefore often does not reflect the realities of the conflict in these societies.

Challenges

The major challenges facing researchers on conflict and peace in South Africa are the continuing integration of the research being undertaken and stimulation of research in the field. The aim of the HSRC-sponsored National Programme for Conflict Management and the resultant National Workshop on Conflict and Peace Research was to integrate and stimulate the pockets of isolated research taking place in the field throughout South Africa. Researchers must accordingly maintain this momentum and ensure ongoing contact with one another.

The need for a database to facilitate contact and access to information collected by various organizations throughout the country was frequently mentioned by participants in the regional and national workshops.

Another challenge will be to make conflict management practitioners and community members aware of the important contribution they can may to research. Capacity building can be achieved by involving them in the research and explaining the process as well as the benefits to them. Information collected through unstructured observations and other unscientific methods needs to be verified to enable decision and policy makers to make decisions based on verifiable rather than subjective information.

Bringing verified information to the attention of policy makers is another challenge. In many government departments and private organizations decisions are still based largely on gut feelings or advice rather than on verified information that can be defended.

Research on policy formulation is essential because of all the policies currently being formulated and adopted in South Africa.

Every focus area in the field of conflict and peace has its own research challenges. For example, in the area of methodology the main challenge is to find the appropriate research method and theoretical paradigm to suit the particular research problem being investigated. The richness of so-called traditional African methods of conflict resolution and the manner in which these methods can be used to enhance so-called Western conflict resolution methods is a contentious but challenging field that can fruitfully be investigated by South African research organizations and individuals. The knowledge gained could substantially enrich the international field of conflict and peace research.

Conflict - even violent conflict - is not over in South Africa. Why is there still violent conflict in KwaZulu-Natal and in other parts of the country? What are the underlying reasons for this conflict and why has it not diminished or ended? A holistic approach is needed to understand the root causes of conflict in South Africa, and to enable the management of this conflict. Systematic research can help uncover the dynamics of the conflict and lead to effective conflict management strategies. More emphasis should be placed on dealing with the causes and not only the symptoms of conflict. By determining the underlying causes of conflict, processes can

be developed to impact on all levels of society to curb violence and establish economic stability.

The challenges for South African researchers in the field of conflict and peace have just begun. Sound research involving the subject and getting this information to the attention of policy makers should be the prime objective of these researchers.